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1. Introduction
Geographical distribution of medical doctors is a contentious issue in health care. One
of the urgent problems is that many hospitals, especially those in rural areas, do not
attract sucient numbers of doctors to meet their demands. For instance, a Washington
Post article entitled \Shortage of Doctors Aects Rural U.S." describes a dire situation
in the United States (Talbott, 2007):
The government estimates that more than 35 million Americans live in
underserved areas, and it would take 16,000 doctors to immediately ll
that need, according to the American Medical Association.
Similar problems are present around the world. For example, one can easily nd reports
of doctor shortages in rural areas in the United Kingdom, India, Australia, and Thailand.
1
One may wonder if the situation can be improved by appropriately designing a cen-
tralized matching mechanism for medical residents, an important part of labor supply for
hospitals. However, the existing literature on stable matching suggests that a solution is
elusive, as the rural hospital theorem (Roth, 1986) shows that any hospital that fails to
ll all its positions in one stable matching is matched to an identical set of doctors in all
stable matchings. This result implies that a hospital that cannot attract enough residents
under one stable matching mechanism cannot increase the number of assigned residents
no matter what other stable mechanism is used.
The shortage of residents in rural hospitals has recently become a hot political issue
in Japan, where the deferred acceptance algorithm (Gale and Shapley, 1962) has placed
around 8,000 graduating medical students to about 1,500 residency programs each year
since 2003. In an attempt to increase the placement of residents to rural hospitals, the
Japanese government recently introduced \regional caps" which, for each of the 47 pre-
fectures that partition the country, restrict the total number of residents matched within
the prefecture. The government modied the deferred acceptance algorithm incorporating
the regional caps beginning in 2009 in an eort to attain its distributional goal.
This paper shows that the current Japanese mechanism, which we call the Japan Res-
idency Matching Program (JRMP) mechanism, may result in avoidable instability and
ineciency despite its resemblance to the deferred acceptance algorithm and proposes a
better mechanism. More specically, we rst introduce concepts of stability and (con-
strained) eciency that take regional caps into account. We point out that the current
Japanese mechanism does not always produce a stable or ecient matching. We present
1Shallcross (2005), Alcoba (2009), Nambiar and Bavas (2010), and Wongruang (2010).IMPROVING EFFICIENCY IN MATCHING MARKETS WITH REGIONAL CAPS 3
a mechanism that we call the exible deferred acceptancce mechanism, which nds a
stable and ecient matching. We show that the mechanism is (group) strategy-proof
for doctors, that is, telling the truth is a dominant strategy for each doctor (and even
a coalition of doctors cannot jointly misreport preferences and benet). The exible de-
ferred acceptance mechanism matches weakly more doctors to hospitals (in the sense of set
inclusion) and makes every doctor weakly better o than the JRMP mechanism. These
results suggest that replacing the current mechanism with the exible deferred acceptance
mechanism will improve the performance of the matching market.
We also nd that the structural properties of the stable matchings with regional caps
are strikingly dierent from those in the standard matching models. First, there does
not necessarily exist a doctor-optimal stable matching (a stable matching unanimously
preferred to every stable matching by all doctors). Neither do there exist hospital-optimal
or doctor-pessimal or hospital-pessimal stable matchings. Second, dierent stable match-
ings can leave dierent hospitals with unlled positions, implying that the conclusion of
the rural hospital theorem fails in our context. Based on these observations, we investi-
gate whether the government can design a reasonable mechanism that selects a particular
stable matching based on its policy goals such as minimizing the number of unmatched
doctors.
Although we closely relate our model to the Japanese residency matching market, the
analysis is applicable to various other contexts in which similar mathematical structures
arise. The rst example is the allocation of residents across dierent medical special-
ties. In the United States, for instance, the association called Accreditation Council for
Graduate Medical Education (ACGME) regulates the total number of residents in each
specialty. The situation is isomorphic to our model in which medical specialties corre-
spond to regions. Second, in some public school districts, multiple school programs often
share one school building. In such a case, there is a natural bound on the total number of
students in these programs in addition to each program's capacity because of the build-
ing's physical size. This gives a mathematical structure isomorphic to the current model,
suggesting that our analysis can be applied to the design of school choice mechanisms
formalized by Abdulkadiro glu and S onmez (2003). Lastly, the shortage of doctors in rural
areas is a common problem around the globe. Countries mentioned above, such as the
United States, the United Kingdom, and India, are just a few examples. If regional caps
are imposed by a regulatory body such as a government, our analysis and mechanism
would be directly applicable.4 YUICHIRO KAMADA AND FUHITO KOJIMA
Let us emphasize that analyzing technical niceties associated with regional caps in the
abstract is not the primary purpose of this paper. On the contrary, we study the market
for Japanese medical residency in detail and oer practical solutions for that market.
Improving the Japanese medical market is important by itself, which produces around
8,000 medical doctors each year. However, another point of this study is to provide a
framework in which one can tackle problems arising in practical markets, which may
prove useful in investigating other problems such as those which we have discussed in the
last paragraph. In that sense, this paper contributes to the general research agenda of
matching and market design, advocated by Roth (2002) for instance, that emphasizes the
importance of addressing issues arising in practical allocation problems.
Related literature. This section discusses papers related to this study. The medical
literature on doctor shortage and the Japanese situation is discussed in the next section.
In the one-to-one matching setting, McVitie and Wilson (1970) show that a doctor
or a hospital that is unmatched at one stable matching is unmatched in every stable
matching. This is the rst statement of the rural hospital theorem to our knowledge, and
its variants and extensions have been established in increasingly general settings by Gale
and Sotomayor (1985a,b), Roth (1984, 1986), Martinez, Masso, Neme, and Oviedo (2000),
and Hateld and Milgrom (2005), among others. As recent results are quite general, it
seems that placing more doctors in rural areas has been believed to be a dicult (if not
impossible) task, thus there are few studies oering solutions to this problem. The current
paper explores possible ways to oer some positive results.
Roth (1991) points out that some hospitals in the United Kingdom prefer to hire no
more than one female doctor while oering multiple positions. Similarly, some schools
(or school districts) desire to maintain certain diversity of the incoming class in terms of
characteristics such as ethnicity and academic performance (Abdulkadiro glu and S onmez,
2003; Abdulkadiro glu, 2005; Ergin and S onmez, 2006). Westkamp (2010) considers a
college admission problem in which colleges have admission criteria based on trait-specic
quotas. If one regards a region (instead of a hospital) as a single agent in our model, these
models and ours appear similar in that an agent in both models has certain \preferences"
over distributions more complex than responsive ones. However, those models are dierent
from ours. For instance, in our model, a distinction should be made between a matching
of a doctor to a hospital in a region and a matching of the same doctor to a dierent
hospital in the same region, but such a distinction cannot be even described in the former
models. This distinction is essential in the context of residency matching because a doctorIMPROVING EFFICIENCY IN MATCHING MARKETS WITH REGIONAL CAPS 5
may have incentives to deviate by moving between hospitals within a single region. Thus
results from these papers cannot be applied in this paper's environment.
Despite the above-mentioned diculty, there is a way to make an association between
our model to an existing model, namely the model of matching with contracts as dened
by Hateld and Milgrom (2005). More specically, given a matching market with regional
caps, one can dene an associated matching model with contracts such that a stable allo-
cation in the latter model induces a stable matching in the former. This correspondence
allows us to show some of our results by using properties of the matching with contracts
model established by Hateld and Milgrom (2005), Hateld and Kojima (2008, 2009),
and Hateld and Kominers (2009, 2010).
2 On the other hand, it is also worth noting that
these models are still dierent. The reason is that certain blocks allowed in the matching
model with contracts are not allowed in our model because, as we will explain later, such
blocks seem infeasible in our context. Thus stable allocations in a matching model with
contracts can induce only a subset of stable matchings in our model. For this reason, the
structural properties of the set of stable matchings in our model are strikingly dierent
from those in matching models with contracts. For instance, a doctor-optimal stable al-
location exists and the conclusion of the rural hospital theorem holds in their model but
not in ours.
3
Abraham, Irving, and Manlove (2007) study allocation of students to projects where a
lecturer may oer multiple projects. Both projects and lecturers have capacity constraints.
S onmez and  Unver (2006) analyze a related model in the context of school choice in
which there may be multiple school programs in a school building. Their models are
analogous to ours if we associate a lecturer and a project { and a school building and a
school, respectively{ in their models to a region and a hospital in our model, respectively.
However, there are two notable dierences. First, they assume that preferences of all
projects provided by the same lecturer (school programs in the same building) are identical
while such a restriction is not imposed in our model.
4 Second, the stability concepts
2Note that residency matching and school choice with balance requirements mentioned in the last
paragraph (Roth, 1991; Abdulkadiro glu and S onmez, 2003) can be modeled as special cases of this paper's
model.
3More specically, the former result holds under the property called the substitute condition, and the
latter under the substitute condition and another property called the law of aggregate demand or size
(or cardinal) monotonicity (Alkan, 2002; Alkan and Gale, 2003).
4In our context, it is important to allow dierent hospitals in the same region to have dierent prefer-
ences because two hospitals rarely have identical preferences in practice.6 YUICHIRO KAMADA AND FUHITO KOJIMA
employed in their models are dierent from ours, thus our results do not reduce to theirs
even in their more specialized settings.
Milgrom (2009) and Budish, Che, Kojima, and Milgrom (2010) consider object alloca-
tion mechanisms with restrictions similar to the regional caps in our model. While their
models are independent of ours (most notably, their analysis is primarily about object
allocation, and stability is not studied), they share motivations with ours in that they
consider exible assignment in the face of complex constraints.
More broadly, this paper is part of a rapidly growing literature on matching market
design. As advocated by Roth (2002), much of recent market design theory advanced
by tackling problems arising in practical markets.
5 For instance, practical considerations
in designing school choice mechanisms in Boston and New York City are discussed by
Abdulkadiro glu, Pathak, and Roth (2005, 2009) and Abdulkadiro glu, Pathak, Roth, and
S onmez (2005, 2006). Abdulkadiro glu, Che, and Yasuda (2008, 2009), Erdil and Er-
gin (2008), and Kesten (2009) analyze alternative mechanisms that may produce more
ecient student placements than those that are currently used in New York City and
Boston. Design issues motivated by an anti-trust lawsuit against the American medi-
cal resident matching clearinghouse are investigated by Bulow and Levin (2006), Kojima
(2007a), Konishi and Sapozhnikov (2008), Niederle (2007), and Niederle and Roth (2003).
A classical resource allocation problem with multi-unit demand has attracted renewed at-
tention in the context of practical course allocation at business schools as studied by
S onmez and  Unver (2010), Budish and Cantillon (2009), and Budish (2010). Initiated by
Roth, S onmez, and  Unver (2004, 2005, 2007), even the organ transplantation problem has
become a subject of market design researches in recent years. See Roth and Sotomayor
(1990) for a comprehensive survey of the matching literature in the rst three decades,
and Roth (2007a) and S onmez and  Unver (2008) for discussion of more recent studies.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the Japanese residency
matching market. In Section 3, we present the model of matching with regional caps and
dene weak stability and eciency. We argue that weak stability is a mild requirement.
Nonetheless, in Section 4 where we dene the JRMP mechanism, we show that it does
not necessarily produce a weakly stable or ecient matching. Section 5 introduces and
analyzes stronger stability concepts. In Section 6 we propose a new mechanism, the
exible deferred acceptance mechanism, and show that it produces a stable and ecient
5Literature on auction market design also emphasizes the importance of solving practical problems
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matching and is group strategy-proof. Section 7 discusses a number of further topics, and
Section 8 concludes. Proofs are in the Appendix unless stated otherwise.
2. Residency Matching in Japan
In Japan, about 8,000 doctors and 1,500 residency programs participate in the match-
ing process each year. This section describes how this process has evolved and how it
aected the debate on the geographical distribution of residents. For further details of
Japanese medical education written in English, see Teo (2007) and Kozu (2006). Also,
information about the matching program written in Japanese is available at the websites
of the government ministry and the matching organizer.
6
Japanese residency matching started in 2003 as part of a comprehensive reform of the
medical residency program. Prior to the reform, clinical departments in university hospi-
tals, called ikyoku, had de facto authority to allocate doctors. The system was criticized
because it was seen to have given clinical departments too much power and resulted in
opaque, inecient, and unfair allocation of doctors against their will.
7 Describing the
situation, Onishi and Yoshida (2004) write \This clinical-department-centred system was
often compared to the feudal hierarchy."
To cope with the above problem a new system, the Japan Residency Matching Pro-
gram (JRMP), introduced a centralized matching procedure using the (doctor-proposing)
deferred acceptance algorithm by Gale and Shapley (1962). Unlike its U.S. counterpart,
the National Resident Matching Program (NRMP), the system has no \match variation"
(Roth and Peranson, 1999) such as married couples, which would make many of good
properties of the deferred acceptance algorithm fail.
Although the matching system was welcomed by many, it also received a lot of criti-
cisms. This is because some hospitals, especially university hospitals in rural areas, felt
that they attracted fewer residents under the new matching mechanism. They argued
that the new system provided too much opportunity for students to work for urban hospi-
tals rather than rural hospitals, resulting in severe doctor shortages in rural areas. While
there is no conclusive evidence on the validity of their claim, an empirical study by Toyabe
(2009) nds that several measures of geographical imbalance of doctors (Gini coecients,
6See the websites of the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare
(http://www.mhlw.go.jp/topics/bukyoku/isei/rinsyo/) and the Japan Residency Matching Program
(http://www.jrmp.jp/).
7The criticism appears to have some justication. For instance, Niederle and Roth (2003) oer empir-
ical evidence that a system without a centralized matching procedure reduces mobility and eciency of
resident allocation in the context of the U.S. gastroenterologist match.8 YUICHIRO KAMADA AND FUHITO KOJIMA
Atkinson index, and Theil index of the per-capita number of doctors across regions) wors-
ened in recent years, while these measures improve when residents are excluded from the
calculation. Based on these ndings, he suggests that the matching system from 2003
may have contributed to a widening regional imbalance of doctors.
To put such criticisms into context, we note that regional imbalance of doctors has been
a long-standing and serious problem in Japan. As of 2004, there were over 160,000 people
living in the so-called mui-chiku, which means \districts with no doctors" (Ministry of
Health, Labour and Welfare, 2005b)
8 and many more who were allegedly underserved.
One government ocial told one of the authors (personal communication) that regional
imbalance is one of the two most important problems in the government's health care
policy, together with nancing health care cost. Popular media regularly report stories of
doctor shortages, often in a very sensational tone.
9 There is evidence that the sucient
stang of doctors in the hospital is positively correlated with the quality of medical care
such as lower mortality (see Pronovost, Angus, Dorman, Robinson, Dremsizov, and Young
(2002) for instance), thus the doctor shortage in rural areas appears to cause bad medical
care.
In response to the criticisms against the matching mechanism, the Japanese government
introduced a new system with regional caps beginning with the matching conducted in
2009. More specically, a regional cap was imposed on the number of residents in each of
the 47 prefectures that partition the country. If the total capacity demanded by hospitals
in the region exceeds the regional cap, then the capacity of each hospital is reduced
to equalize the total capacity with the regional cap.
10 Then the deferred acceptance
algorithm is implemented under the reduced capacities. We call this mechanism the
Japan Residency Matching Program (JRMP) mechanism. The basic intuition behind
8A mui-chiku is dened by various criteria such as the ease of access to hospitals, the population, the
regularity of clinic openings, and so forth (Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, 2005a).
9For instance, the Yomiuri Shimbun newspaper, with circulation of over 10,000,000, recently provoked
a controversy by its article about the only doctor in Kamikoani-mura village, where 2,800 people live
(Yomiuri Shimbun newspaper, 03/19/2010). Although the doctor, aged 65, took only 18 days o a year,
she was persistently criticized by some \unreasonable demanding" patients. When she announced that
she wanted to quit (which means that the village will be left with no doctor) because she was \exhausted,"
600 signatures were collected in only 10 days, to change her mind.
10The capacity of a hospital is reduced proportionately to its original capacity in principle (subject to
integrality constraints), but there are a number of ne adjustments and exceptions. If the total capacities
demanded by hospitals in the region does not exceed the regional cap, then the capacities of hospitals in
the regions are kept unchanged.IMPROVING EFFICIENCY IN MATCHING MARKETS WITH REGIONAL CAPS 9
this policy is that if residents are denied from urban hospitals because of the reduced
capacities, then some of them will work for rural hospitals.
Figure 1. Regional caps and total capacities. For each prefecture,
the total capacity is the sum of advertised positions in hospitals located in
the prefecture in 2008. The regional caps are based on the government's
plan in 2008 (Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, 2009a). Negative
values of total capacities in some prefectures indicate the excess amount of
regional caps beyond the advertised positions.
The magnitude of the regional cap is illustrated in Figure 1. Relatively large reductions
are imposed on urban areas. For instance, hospitals in Tokyo and Osaka advertised 1,582
and 860 positions in 2008, respectively, but the government set the regional cap of 1,287
and 533, the largest reductions in the number of positions. The largest reduction in
proportion is imposed on Kyoto, which oered 353 positions in 2008 but the number
would drop to 190, a reduction of about 46 percent. Indeed, the projected changes were so
large that the government provided a temporary measure that limits per-year reductions
within a certain bound in the rst years of operation, though the plan is to reach the
planned regional cap eventually. In total, 34 out of 47 prefectures are given regional caps
smaller than the number of advertised positions in 2008.10 YUICHIRO KAMADA AND FUHITO KOJIMA
The new JRMP mechanism with regional caps was used in 2009 for the rst time. The
government claims that the change alleviated regional imbalance of residents: It reports
that the proportion of residents matched to hospitals in rural areas has risen to 52.3
percent, an increase of one percentage point from the previous year (Ministry of Health,
Labour and Welfare, 2009b).
11 Meanwhile, there is mounting criticism to the JRMP
mechanism as well. For instance, a number of governors of rural prefectures (see Tottori
Prefecture (2009) for instance) and a student group (Association of Medical Students,
2009) have demanded that the government modify or abolish the JRMP mechanism with
regional caps.
12 Among other things, a commonly expressed concern is that the current
system with regional caps causes eciency loss, for instance preventing residents from
learning their desired skills for practicing medical treatments. In the subsequent sections,
we oer a theoretical framework to formally analyze these issues related to the regional
cap and the existing JRMP mechanism.
3. Model
Let there be a set of doctors D and a set of hospitals H.13 Each doctor d has a strict
preference relation d over the set of hospitals and being unmatched (being unmatched is
denoted by ;). For any h;h0 2 H [f;g, we write h d h0 if and only if h d h0 or h = h0.
Each hospital h has a strict preference relation h over the set of subsets of doctors. For
any D0;D00  D, we write D0 h D00 if and only if D0 h D00 or D0 = D00. We denote by
= (i)i2D[H the preference prole of all doctors and hospitals.
Doctor d is said to be acceptable to h if d h ;.14 Similarly, h is acceptable to d if
h d ;. Since only rankings of acceptable mates matter for our analysis, we often write
only acceptable mates to denote preferences. For example,
d: h;h
0
means that hospital h is the most preferred, h0 is the second most preferred, and h and
h0 are the only acceptable hospitals under preferences d of doctor d.
11Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (2009b) denes \rural areas" as all prefectures except for 6
prefectures, Tokyo, Kyoto, Osaka, Kanagawa, Aichi, and Fukuoka, which have large cities.
12Interestingly, even regional governments in rural areas such as Tokushima and Tottori were opposed
to the JRMP mechanism. They were worried that since the system reduces capacities of each hospital
in the region, some of which could hire more residents, it can reduce the number of residents allocated
in the regions even further. This feature - inexibility of the way capacities are reduced - is one of the
problems of the current JRMP mechanism, which we try to remedy by our alternative mechanism.
13We follow the convention in the literature to refer to a residency program as a \hospital."
14We denote singleton set fxg by x when there is no confusion.IMPROVING EFFICIENCY IN MATCHING MARKETS WITH REGIONAL CAPS 11
Given hospital h 2 H and nonnegative integer qh, we say that preference relation h
is responsive with capacity qh (Roth, 1985) if
(1) For any D0  D with jD0j  qh, d 2 D n D0 and d0 2 D0, D0 [ d n d0 h D0 if and
only if d h d0,
(2) For any D0  D with jD0j  qh and d0 2 D0, D0 h D0 n d0 if and only if d0 h ;,
and
(3) ; h D0 for any D0  D with jD0j  qh.
In words, preference relation h is responsive with a capacity if the ranking of a doctor
(or keeping a position vacant) is independent of her colleagues, and any set of doctors
exceeding its capacity is unacceptable. We assume that preferences of all hospitals are
responsive throughout the paper.
There is a nite set R which we call the set of regions. The set of hospitals H is
partitioned into hospitals in dierent regions, that is, Hr \ Hr0 = ; if r 6= r0 and H =
[r2RHr , where Hr denotes the set of hospitals in region r 2 R. For each h 2 H, let r(h)
denote the region r such that h 2 Hr. For each region r 2 R, there is a regional cap qr,
which is a nonnegative integer.
A matching  is a mapping that satises (i) d 2 H [ f;g for all d 2 D, (ii) h  D
for all h 2 H, and (iii) for any d 2 D and h 2 H, d = h if and only if d 2 h. That is, a
matching simply species which doctor is assigned to which hospital (if any). A matching
is feasible if jrj  qr for all r 2 R, where r = [h2Hrh. In other words, feasibility
requires that the regional cap for every region is satised. This requirement distinguishes
the current environment from the standard model in the literature without regional caps.
Since regional caps are part of primitive of the environment, we consider a constrained
eciency concept. A feasible matching  is (constrained) ecient if there is no other
feasible matching 0 such that 0
i i i for all i 2 D [ H.
To accommodate the regional caps, we introduce new stability concepts that generalize
the standard notion. For that purpose, we rst dene two basic concepts. A matching 
is individually rational if (i) for each d 2 D, d d ;, and (ii) for each h 2 H, d h ;
for all d 2 h, and jhj  qh. That is, no agent is matched with an unacceptable partner
and each hospital's capacity is respected.
Given matching , a pair (d;h) of a doctor and a hospital is called a blocking pair if
h d d and either (i) jhj < qh and d h ;, or (ii) d h d0 for some d0 2 h. In words,
a blocking pair is a pair of a doctor and a hospital who want to be matched with each
other (possibly rejecting their partners in the prescribed matching) rather than following
the proposed matching.12 YUICHIRO KAMADA AND FUHITO KOJIMA
When there are no binding regional caps (in the sense that qr > jDj for every r 2 R),
a matching is said to be stable if it is individually rational and there is no blocking pair.
Gale and Shapley (1962) show that there exists a stable matching in that setting. In the
presence of binding regional caps, however, there may be no such matching that is feasible
(in the sense that all regional caps are respected). Thus in some cases every feasible and
individually rational matching may admit a blocking pair.
Given this observation, we dene a weaker stability concept, in which a certain type
of blocking pairs are admitted. More specically, whenever there is a blocking pair, we
require that it is \caused" by the existence of regional caps. Recall that r(h) is the region
that h belongs to.
Denition 1. A matching  is weakly stable if it is feasible, individually rational, and
if (d;h) is a blocking pair then (i) jr(h)j = qr(h) and (ii) d0 h d for all d0 2 h.
As seen in the denition, only certain blocking pairs are admitted. More specically, if
doctor d and hospital h constitute a blocking pair then (i) the cap of hospital h's region
is lled with doctors, and (ii) h prefers every currently matched doctor to d. If (d;h) is a
blocking pair, condition (ii) implies that hospital h has a vacant position and desires to
ll it with doctor d. Condition (i) is motivated by the idea that such a blocking may be
problematic in relation to feasibility because the number of doctors in the region already
equals its regional cap. In this sense, weak stability requires that any blocking pair is
\caused" by regional caps. Indeed, this concept reduces to the standard stability concept
of Gale and Shapley (1962) if there is no binding regional cap.
The implicit idea behind the denition is that the government or some authority can
interfere and prohibit a blocking pair to be formed if regional caps are an issue. Indeed,
in Japan, participants seem to be eectively forced to accept the matching announced
by the clearinghouse because a severe punishment is imposed on deviators.15 When we
presented this explanation in seminars, we often received the following question: If the
government has power to prohibit a blocking pair in certain cases, why doesn't it have
power to do so in all cases, so why do we care about stability in the rst place?
Our response is that even if the clearinghouse has power to force matching (which may
be the case in the Japanese residency match), an assignment that completely ignores
participants' preferences would be undesirable. Indeed, as we discussed in Section 2, the
introduction of a stable matching mechanism in this market was motivated by the criticism
that the previous assignment system was \unfair" and \inecient," rather than by a desire
15For example, violating hospitals can be excluded from participating in the matching mechanism in
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to prevent participants from circumventing the assignment by forming \blocking pairs."16
Given this observation, we view a stability concept as a normative criterion, and our weak
stability captures the idea that it is desirable to minimize blocking pairs so that the only
blocking pairs are \caused" by regional caps, which may be a justiable reason to deny a
blocking pair.
A potential drawback of weak stability is that it allows for the existence of a blocking
pair (d;h) such that the regional cap of r(h), h's region, is full even if d is currently
assigned to a hospital in r(h) (that is, d 2 Hr(h)). In practice, however, such a blocking
pair may be a legitimate deviation because the total number of doctors matched within
the region does not increase, thus the regional cap continues to be respected. Example 3
in Section 5 makes this point explicit.
For this reason, we do not necessarily claim that weak stability is the most natural
stability concept. In fact, we will introduce stronger concepts of stability later and analyze
them to account for the issue discussed above. The main point of introducing weak
stability for now is that, although this is a weak notion, we will later show that a matching
produced by the current JRMP mechanism does not necessarily satisfy weak stability.
A mechanism ' is a function that maps preference proles to matchings. The match-
ing under ' at preference prole  is denoted '() and agent i's matching is denoted by
'i() for each i 2 D [ H.
A mechanism ' is said to be strategy-proof if there does not exist a preference prole
, an agent i 2 D [ H, and preferences 0




That is, no agent has an incentive to misreport her preferences under the mechanism.
Strategy-proofness is regarded as a very important property for a mechanism to be suc-
cessful.17
16Another example of a labor market using a stable mechanism despite being heavily regulated is the
labor market for junior academic positions in France (Haeringer and Iehle, 2010).
17One good aspect of having strategy-proofness is that the matching authority can actually state it
as the property of the algorithm to encourage doctors to reveal their true preferences. For example, the
current webpage of the JRMP (last accessed on May 25, 2010, http://www.jrmp.jp/01-ryui.htm) states,
as advice for doctors, that \If you list as your rst choice a program which is not actually your rst choice,
the probability that you end up being matched with some hospital does not increase [...] the probability
that you are matched with your actual rst choice decreases." In the context of student placement in
Boston, strategy-proofness was regarded as a desirable fairness property, in the sense that it provides
equal access for children and parents with dierent degrees of sophistication to strategize (Pathak and
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Unfortunately, however, there is no mechanism that produces a weakly stable matching
for all possible preference proles and is strategy-proof even in a market without regional
caps, that is, qr > jDj for all r 2 R (Roth, 1982).18 Given this limitation, we consider the
following weakening of the concept requiring incentive compatibility only for doctors. A
mechanism ' is said to be strategy-proof for doctors if there does not exist a preference
prole , a doctor d 2 D, and preferences 0




A mechanism ' is said to be group strategy-proof for doctors if there is no prefer-
ence prole , a subset of doctors D0  D, and a preference prole (0
d0)d02D0 of doctors
in D0 such that
'd((
0
d0)d02D0;(i)i2D[HnD0) d 'd() for all d 2 D
0:
That is, no subset of doctors can jointly misreport their preferences to receive a strictly
preferred outcome for every member of the coalition under the mechanism.
We do not necessarily regard (group) strategy-proofness for doctors as a minimum de-
sirable property that our mechanism should satisfy (our criticism of the JRMP mechanism
in Section 4 does not hinge on (group) strategy-proofness), but it will turn out that the
exible deferred acceptance mechanism we propose in Section 6 does have this property.
As this paper analyzes the eect of regional caps in matching markets, it is useful to
compare it with the standard matching model without regional caps. Gale and Shapley
(1962) consider a matching model without any binding regional cap, which corresponds
to a special case of our model in which qr > jDj for every r 2 R. In that model, they
propose the following (doctor-proposing) deferred acceptance algorithm:
 Step 1: Each doctor applies to her rst choice hospital. Each hospital rejects
the lowest-ranking doctors in excess of its capacity and all unacceptable doctors
among those who applied to it, keeping the rest of the doctors temporarily (so
doctors not rejected at this step may be rejected in later steps).
In general,
 Step t: Each doctor who was rejected in Step (t   1) applies to her next high-
est choice (if any). Each hospital considers these doctors and doctors who are
temporarily held from the previous step together, and rejects the lowest-ranking
doctors in excess of its capacity and all unacceptable doctors, keeping the rest of
18Remember that a special case of our model in which qr > jDj for all r 2 R is the standard matching
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the doctors temporarily (so doctors not rejected at this step may be rejected in
later steps).
The algorithm terminates at a step in which no rejection occurs. The algorithm always
terminates in a nite number of steps. In their basic setting, Gale and Shapley (1962)
show that the resulting matching is stable in the standard matching model without any
binding regional cap.
Even though there exists no strategy-proof mechanism that produces a stable matching
for all possible inputs, the deferred acceptance mechanism is group strategy-proof for
doctors (Dubins and Freedman, 1981; Roth, 1982).19 The result has been extended by
many subsequent researches, suggesting that the incentive compatibility of the mechanism
is quite robust and general.20
4. The JRMP Mechanism and its Deficiency
In the JRMP mechanism, there is a government-imposed target capacity  qh  qh for
each hospital h such that
P
h2Hr  qh  qr for each region r 2 R. The JRMP mechanism
is a rule that produces the matching resulting from the deferred acceptance algorithm
except that, for each hospital h, it uses  qh instead of qh as the hospital's capacity.
The JRMP mechanism is based on a simple idea: In order to satisfy regional caps,
simply force hospitals to be matched to a smaller number of doctors than their real
capacities, but otherwise use the standard deferred acceptance algorithm.
In our theoretical model we assume that  qh is exogenously given for each hospital h. In
the current Japanese system, if the sum of the hospitals' capacities exceeds the regional
cap, then the target  qh of each hospital h is set at an integer close to
qr P
h02Hr qh0 qh. That
is, each hospital's target is (roughly) proportional to its capacity. This might suggest that
hospitals have incentives to misreport their true capacities, but in Japan, the government
regulates how many positions each hospital can oer so that the capacity can be considered
exogenous. More specically, the government decides the physical capacity of a hospital
based on veriable information such as the number of beds in it.
19Ergin (2002) denes a stronger version of group strategy-proofness. It requires that no group of
students can misreport preferences jointly and make some of its members strictly better o without
making any of its members strictly worse o. He identies a necessary and sucient condition for the
deferred acceptance mechanism to satisfy this version of group strategy-proofness.
20Researches generalizing (group) strategy-proofness of the mechanism include Abdulkadiro glu (2005),
Hateld and Milgrom (2005), Martinez, Masso, Neme, and Oviedo (2004), Hateld and Kojima (2008,
2009), and Hat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Although the mechanism is a variant of the deferred acceptance algorithm, the mecha-
nism suers from at least two problems. The rst problem is about stability: Despite its
intention, the result of the JRMP mechanism is not necessarily weakly stable, as seen in
the following example. The example also illustrates how the JRMP mechanism works.
Example 1 (JRMP mechanism does not necessarily produce a weakly stable matching).
There is one region r with regional cap qr = 10, in which two hospitals, h1 and h2, reside.
Each hospital h has a capacity of qh = 10. Suppose that there are 10 doctors, d1;:::;d10.
Preference prole  is as follows:
hi: d1;d2;:::;d10; for i = 1;2;
dj: h1 if j  3 and dj: h2 if j  4:
That is, three doctors prefer hospital h1 to being unmatched to hospital h2, while the
other seven doctors prefer hospital h2 to being unmatched to hospital h1.





10+10 10 = 5 for each hospital h and consider the JRMP mechanism associated with this
target prole. At the rst round of the algorithm, doctors d1, d2 and d3 apply to hospital
h1, and the rest of doctors apply to hospital h2. Hospital h1 does not reject anyone at
this round, as the number of applicants is less than its target capacity, and all applicants
are acceptable. Hospital h2 rejects d9 and d10 and accepts other applicants, because the
number of applicants exceeds the target capacity (not the hospital's capacity itself!), and
it prefers doctors with smaller indices (and all doctors are acceptable). Since d9 and d10
prefer being unmatched to h1, they do not make further applications, so the algorithm
terminates at this point. Hence the resulting matching  is such that
h1 = fd1;d2;d3g and h2 = fd4;d5;d6;d7;d8g:
This is not weakly stable: For example, hospital h2 and doctor d9 constitute a blocking
pair while the regional cap for r is not binding. One may wonder whether the failure
of weak stability depends on the assumption that some agents nd some of potential
partners unacceptable. However, a similar example can be constructed even if we require
every agent nds every potential partner acceptable.21
21For instance, modify the market in the example by introducing another hospital h3 in another region
with regional cap two; let h3 nd every doctor acceptable and have two positions; d1, d2 and d3 prefer h1
to h3 to h2 to being unmatched, while all other doctors prefer h2 to h3 to h1 to being unmatched (thus
every doctor nds all hospitals acceptable). The resulting matching is , which violates weak stability.IMPROVING EFFICIENCY IN MATCHING MARKETS WITH REGIONAL CAPS 17
The second problem is about eciency: The JRMP mechanism may result in an ine-
cient matching even in the constrained sense, as demonstrated in the following example.
Example 2 (JRMP mechanism does not necessarily produce an ecient matching).




h1 = fd1;d2;d3g and 
0
h2 = fd4;d5;d6;d7;d8;d9;d10g:
Since the regional cap is still respected, 0 is feasible. Moreover, every agent is weakly
better o with doctors d9 and d10 being strictly better o than at . Hence we conclude
that the JRMP mechanism results in an inecient matching in this example.22
The above two examples suggest that a problem of the JRMP mechanism is its lack
of exibility: The JRMP mechanism runs as if the target capacity is the actual capacity
of hospitals, thus rejecting an application of a doctor to a hospital unnecessarily. The
mechanism that we propose in Section 6 overcomes problems of both stability and inef-
ciency by, intuitively speaking, making the target capacities exible. Before formally
introducing the mechanism, we dene and discuss our goal that we try to achieve by the
mechanism.
5. Goal Setting: Stability Concepts and Strategy-Proofness
As discussed earlier, the concept of weak stability introduced in the previous section
is rather weak. This is because it does not regard certain blocking pairs as legitimate
deviations even if they can be matched without violating the feasibility constraint related
to regional caps. Then a natural question is: What is the \right" stability concept? In
this section, we propose two stability concepts that are stronger than the one proposed
in Section 3 and analyze their relevance and relationships. The objective in this section
is not to discuss technical details of these stability concepts per se, but to set an explicit
goal for constructing a new algorithm, which we introduce in Section 6.
Before dening and discussing the stability concepts, we demonstrate that the weak
notion of stability does imply a desirable property, namely eciency:
22In this example, not all hospitals are acceptable to all doctors. One may wonder whether this is
an unrealistic assumption because doctors may be so willing to work that any hospital is acceptable
(which may be a natural assumption because, for instance, typically a hospital only lists doctors who
they interviewed). However, the example can be easily modied so that all hospitals are acceptable to
all doctors while some doctors are unacceptable to some hospitals. Also, in many markets doctors apply
to only nd a small subset of hospitals. In 2009, for instance, a doctor applied to only 3.3 hospitals on
average Japan Residency Matching Program (2009a).18 YUICHIRO KAMADA AND FUHITO KOJIMA
Theorem 1. Any weakly stable matching is ecient.
When there is no regional cap (in which case weak stability reduces to the standard
concept of stability), a matching is stable if and only if it is in the core, and any core
outcome is ecient. Without regional caps, Theorem 1 follows straightforwardly from
these facts. With regional caps, however, there is no obvious way to dene an appropriate
cooperative game or a core concept. Theorem 1 states that eciency of weakly stable
matchings still holds in our model.23
Now we formalize the stability concepts that are stronger than the weak stability as
dened in Section 3. The rst notion presented below is meant to capture the idea that
any blocking pair that will not violate the regional cap should be considered legitimate,
so the appropriate stability concept should require that no agents have incentives to form
any such blocking pair.
Denition 2. A matching  is strongly stable if it is feasible, individually rational,
and if (d;h) is a blocking pair then (i) jr(h)j = qr(h), (ii) d0 h d for all d0 2 h, and (iii)
d = 2 Hr(h).
The dierence from weak stability dened in Denition 1 is an added condition (iii),
\d 62 Hr(h)." That is, a blocking pair such that the doctor in the pair moves between
two hospitals in the same region should not exist. This is because such a movement
keeps the total number of doctors in a region unchanged. The only blocking pair that
can remain under this denition would actually violate the regional cap since condition
(i) implies that the region's cap is currently binding, condition (ii) implies that the only
blocking involves lling a vacant position, and condition (iii) implies that the doctor is
not currently assigned in the hospital's region.
To see the dierence between weak stability and strong stability clearly, consider the
following example.
Example 3 (Strong stability is strictly stronger than weak stability). There is one region
r with regional cap qr = 1, in which two hospitals, h1 and h2, reside. Each hospital h has
a capacity of qh = 1. Suppose that there is only one doctor, d. Preferences are specied
as follows:
hi: d for i = 1;2;
d: h1;h2:
23To overcome the above diculty, the proof presented in the Appendix shows this result directly
rather than associating stability to the core in a cooperative game.IMPROVING EFFICIENCY IN MATCHING MARKETS WITH REGIONAL CAPS 19














In each of matchings  and 0, since the regional cap is binding, d is not allowed to
change the partner. Moreover, since no one is unacceptable by anyone, any matching
is individually rational. Thus both  and 0 are weakly stable. By contrast, only  is
strongly stable: To check the strong stability of this matching, note just that the match
of d and h1 pairs the rst choices of each other. Matching 0 is not strongly stable because
(d;h1) is a blocking pair and 0
d = h2 2 Hr(h1) so the regional cap would not be violated.
The above example shows that strong stability is a strictly stronger concept than weak
stability. Nonetheless, we will not pursue to achieve strongly stable matchings when we
construct an algorithm in Section 6. There are at least two reasons for this. The rst
reason is that a strongly stable matching does not necessarily exist. The following example
demonstrates this point.
Example 4 (A strongly stable matching does not necessarily exist). There is one region
r with regional cap qr = 1, in which two hospitals, h1 and h2, reside. Each hospital h
has a capacity of qh = 1. Suppose that there are two doctors, d1 and d2. We assume the
following preferences:
h1: d1;d2; h2: d2;d1;
d1: h2;h1; d2: h1;h2:
Matching  such that h1 = fd1g and h2 = ; is weakly stable since h1 is matched to its
rst choice and the regional cap is binding. Similarly 0 such that 0
h1 = ; and 0
h2 = fd2g
is also weakly stable. It is easy to see that these are the only weakly stable matchings.
However, neither  nor 0 is strongly stable. To see that  is not strongly stable, note
that a pair (d1;h2) constitutes a blocking pair and d1 = h1 2 Hr(h2) so the regional cap
would not be violated. Similarly 0 is not strongly stable. Therefore, a strongly stable
matching does not exist in this market.
Even if a strongly stable matching does not always exist, can we try to achieve a weaker
desideratum? More specically, does there exist a mechanism that selects a strongly stable
matching whenever there exists one? We show that such a mechanism does not exist if we
also require certain incentive compatibility: There is no mechanism that selects a strongly20 YUICHIRO KAMADA AND FUHITO KOJIMA
stable matching whenever there exists one and is strategy-proof for doctors. This is the
second reason that we do not attempt to achieve strong stability as a natural desideratum.
To see this point consider the following example.
Example 5 (No mechanism that is strategy-proof for doctors selects a strongly stable
matching whenever there exists one). There is one region r with regional cap qr = 1, in
which two hospitals, h1 and h2, reside. Each hospital h has a capacity of qh = 1. Suppose
that there are two doctors, d1 and d2. We assume the following preferences:
h1: d1;d2; h2: d2;d1;
d1: h2; d2: h1:













Now, suppose that a mechanism chooses  under the above preference prole . Then





Then 0 is a unique strongly stable matching, so the mechanism chooses 0 at (0
d1; d1
). Doctor d1 is better o at 0 than at  since she is matched to h2 at 0 while she
is unmatched at . Hence, d1 can protably misreport her preferences when her true
preferences are d1.
If a mechanism chooses 0 under the above preference prole , then by a symmetric
argument, doctor d2 can protably misreport her preferences when her true preferences
are d2. Therefore there does not exist a mechanism that is strategy-proof for doctors
and selects a strongly stable matching whenever there exists one.
The above examples show that a strongly stable matching need not exist, and there
exists no mechanism that is strategy-proof for doctors and selects a strongly stable match-
ing whenever there exists one. These results suggest that the concept of strong stability
is not appropriate as our desideratum.
Although strong stability is \too strong" in the senses discussed above, it may still be
desirable to have a notion stronger than weak stability. Strong stability is too strong
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violate a regional cap. One natural idea to restrict blocking pairs that are regarded as
legitimate is to use the notion of target capacity. More specically, we now regard target
capacities ( qh)h2H to be part of primitives and dene the stability concept that tries to
respect target capacities as much as possible.
Denition 3. A matching  is stable if it is feasible, individually rational, and if (d;h)
is a blocking pair then (i) jr(h)j = qr(h), (ii) d0 h d for all d0 2 h, and
(iii') either d = 2 Hr(h) or j0
hj    qh > j0
dj    qd,
where 0 is a matching such that 0
d = h and 0
d0 = d0 for all d0 6= d.
This concept is stronger than weak stability while weaker than strong stability. Condi-
tions (i) and (ii) in the denition of weak stability are also required in stability, so stability
is stronger than weak stability. Meanwhile stability is dierent from strong stability in
that condition (iii) in strong stability is replaced by a condition (iii') and, since there are
more possible cases in (iii') than in (iii), stability is weaker than strong stability.24
The rst part of condition (iii'), d 62 Hr(h), is identical to condition (iii) and addresses
the case in which the deviating doctor is currently assigned outside the region of the
deviating hospital. The second part declares that certain types of blocking pairs within a
region (note that d 2 Hr(h) holds in the remaining case) are not regarded as legitimate
deviations. To see this point, consider the inequality in condition (iii'),
j
0
hj    qh > j
0
dj    qd: (5.1)
The left-hand side is the number of doctors matched to h in excess of its target  qh if d
actually moves to h, realizing a new matching 0. The right hand side is the number of
doctors matched to the original hospital d in excess of its target  qd if d moves out of
d. This property says that such a movement will not decrease the imbalance of over-
target numbers of matching across hospitals. Intuitively, if the movement of the doctor
in the blocking pair \equalizes" the excess over the target capacity than the current
matching (that is, j0
hj   qh  j0
dj   qd), then such a movement should be regarded as a
valid deviation. Thus, the only blocking pair within a region that can remain under this
denition should satisfy condition (5.1).
We note that there may be other natural denitions of stability. For example, it may be
desirable to entitle a hospital with capacity 20 to twice as many doctors over the target as
a hospital with capacity 10. There may also be other criteria that are deemed desirable.
24For an example in which the three stability concepts { weak stability, stability, and strong stability
{ lead to dierent choices of matchings, consider Example 4 with the additional specication of a target
capacity pro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To address this issue, in Section 7.3 and Appendix B we consider a class of stability
concepts that includes the stability in Denition 3 as a special case and accommodates
the above ideas.25 For each stability notion from that class, we present a mechanism that
generates a stable matching. In the main part of this paper, we assume that the policy
goal is expressed as in condition (5.1). However, this particular choice of the policy goal is
not a necessary requirement for our analysis to work, as we will observe in Section 7.3 and
Appendix B. We chose this condition because it is expositionally simple and appears to
be a reasonable starting point. The choice of a particular variant of stability should be in
part the product of society's preferences, and we restrict ourselves to proposing solutions
that are exible enough to meet as wide a range of policy goals as possible.
A natural question is whether a stable matching exists in every market. This question
will be answered in the armative in the next section, where we propose an algorithm
that always generates a stable matching.
6. The New Mechanism: The Flexible Deferred Acceptance Mechanism
We present a new mechanism that, for any given input, results in a stable matching.
To do so, we rst dene the exible deferred acceptance algorithm:
Assume that a target capacity prole ( qh)h2H is given as in the JRMP mechanism.
For each r 2 R, specify order of hospitals in region r so that Hr = fh1;h2;:::;hjHrjg.
Given this order, consider the following algorithm.
(1) Begin with an empty matching, that is, a matching  such that d = ; for all
d 2 D.
(2) Choose a doctor d who is currently not tentatively matched to any hospital and
who has not applied to all acceptable hospitals yet. If such a doctor does not exist,
then terminate the algorithm.
(3) Let d apply to the most preferred hospital  h at d among the hospitals that have
not rejected d so far. Let r be the region such that  h 2 Hr.
(4) (a) For each h 2 Hr, let D0
h be the entire set of doctors who have applied to
but have not been rejected by h so far. For each hospital h 2 Hr, choose  qh
best acceptable doctors according to h from D0
h if they exist, and otherwise
choose all acceptable doctors related to h. Formally, for each h 2 Hr choose
25In Appendix D we consider a stability concept stronger than the stability concepts in this class (while
weaker than strong stability) and show that this concept suers from the same types of drawbacks (as in
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D00 such that D00  D0
h, jD00j = minf qh;jD0
hjg, and d h d0 for any d 2 D00
and d0 2 D0
h n D00.
(b) One by one, let each hospital in the region choose the best remaining doctor
until the regional quota qr is lled or the capacity of the hospital is lled or no
doctor remains to be matched. Formally, let i = 0 for all i 2 f1;2;:::;jHrjg.
Let i = 1.
(i) If either the number of doctors already chosen by the region r as a whole
equals qr, or i = 1, then go back to Step 2.
(ii) Otherwise, let hi choose the most preferred (acceptable) doctor in D0
h
at h among the doctors that have not been chosen by hi so far, if such
a doctor exists and the number of doctors chosen by hi so far is strictly
smaller than qhi.
(iii) If no new doctor was chosen at Step 4(b)ii, then set i = 1. If a new doc-
tor was chosen at Step 4(b)ii, then set j = 0 for all j 2 f1;2;:::;jHrjg.
If i < jHrj then increment i by one and if i = jHrj then set i to be 1
and go back to Step 4(b)i.
We dene the exible deferred acceptance mechanism to be a mechanism that
produces, for each input, the matching at the termination of the above algorithm.26
The exible deferred acceptance mechanism is analogous to the deferred acceptance
mechanism and the JRMP mechanism. What distinguishes the exible deferred accep-
tance mechanism from the JRMP mechanism is that it lets hospitals ll their capacities
\exibly" than the latter. To see this point, rst observe that the way that hospitals
choose doctors who applied in (4)(a) is essentially identical to the one in the JRMP al-
gorithm. As seen before, the JRMP may result in an inecient and unstable matching
because this step does not let hospitals to tentatively keep doctors beyond target ca-
pacities even if regional caps are not binding. This is addressed in step (4)(b). In that
step, hospitals in a region are allowed to keep more doctors than their target capacities
if doing so keeps the regional caps respected. Thus there is a sense in which this algo-
rithm corrects the deciency of the JRMP mechanism while following closely the deferred
acceptance algorithm.
In the exible deferred acceptance algorithm, one needs to specify order of hospitals.
We will discuss in Subsection 7.4 the eect of dierent ways of setting order on the welfare
of hospitals.
The following example illustrates how the exible deferred acceptance algorithm works.
26We show in Thorem 2 that the algorithm stops in 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Example 6 (The exible deferred acceptance algorithm). Consider the same example as
in Example 1. Remember that the JRMP mechanism can produce a matching that violates
both eciency and weak stability, let alone stability. The exible deferred acceptance
algorithm selects a matching that is ecient and stable. Precisely, let doctors apply to
hospitals in the specied order. For doctors d1 to d8, the algorithm does not go in to step
(4)-(b), as the number of doctors in each hospital is no larger than its target. When d9
applies, doctors d1;:::;d8 are still matched to hospitals in step (4)-(a), and d9 is matched
to h2 in step (4)-(b). In the same way, when d10 applies, doctors d1;:::;d8 are still
matched to hospitals in step (4)-(a), and d9 and d10 are matched to h2 in step (4)-(b).
Hence an ecient and stable matching results. Intuitively, the algorithm allows doctors
to apply to hospitals in a more exible manner than in the JRMP algorithm. This is the
idea behind the name \exible deferred acceptance."
The following is the main result of this section.
Theorem 2. The exible deferred acceptance algorithm stops in nite steps. The mech-
anism produces a stable matching for any input and is group strategy-proof for doctors.
To see an intuition for stability of the exible deferred acceptance mechanism, recall that
there is a sense in which hospitals ll their capacities \exibly" in the exible deferred
acceptance algorithm. More specically, at each step hospitals can tentatively accept
doctors beyond the target capacities as long as the regional cap is not violated. Then
the kind of rejection that causes instability in Example 1 does not occur in the exible
deferred acceptance algorithm. Thus an acceptable doctor is rejected from a preferred
hospital either because there are enough better doctors in that hospital, or the regional
quota is lled by other doctors. So such a doctor cannot form a blocking pair, suggesting
that the resulting matching is stable.27
The intuition for strategy-proofness for doctors is similar to the one for the deferred
acceptance mechanism. A doctor does not need to give up trying for her rst choice
because, even if she is rejected, she will be able to apply to her second choice, and so
forth. In other words, the \deferred" acceptance guarantees that she will be treated
equally if she applies to a position later than others.
Although the above are rough intuitions of the results, the formal proof presented in
Appendix B takes a dierent approach. It relates our model to the model of \(many-
to-many) matching with contracts" (Hateld and Milgrom, 2005). The basic idea of the
27The way that hospitals' capacities are lled after target capacties are lled ensures that no such
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proof is to regard each region as a consortium of hospitals that acts as one agent, and to
dene its choice function that selects a subset from any given collection of pairs (contracts)
of a doctor and a hospital in the region. Once we successfully connect our model to the
matching model with contracts, properties of that model can be invoked to show the
theorem. In fact, the proof shows a more general result (Theorem 4) holds that can be
applicable to the class of stability concepts mentioned in Section 7.3 and that the current
model is indeed a special case of the general model (Propositions 5 and 6), thus Theorem
2 follows as a corollary.
Theorems 1 and 2 imply an appealing welfare property of the exible deferred accep-
tance mechanism.
Corollary 1. The exible deferred acceptance mechanism produces an ecient matching
for any input.
Proof. By Theorem 2, the exible deferred acceptance mechanism produces a stable
matching. Since stability implies weak stability, the exible deferred acceptance mecha-
nism produces a weakly stable matching. By Theorem 1, weak stability implies eciency,
completing the proof. 
Recall that the JRMP mechanism does not necessarily produce an ecient matching.
In light of this observation, Corollary 1 implies that the exible deferred acceptance
mechanism improves upon the JRMP mechanism not only in terms of stability but also
in terms eciency.
The matching generated by the exible deferred acceptance mechanism satises the
following additional property.
Proposition 1. If the number of doctors matched with h 2 H in the exible deferred
acceptance mechanism is strictly less than its target capacity, for any d 2 D who are not
matched with h, either d is unacceptable to h or d prefers its current match to h.
Proof. Assume that d prefers h to her outcome under the exible deferred acceptance
mechanism. Then d has applied to h and was rejected under the exible deferred ac-
ceptance algorithm. If the number of doctors matched with h in the exible deferred
acceptance mechanism is strictly less than its target capacity, then the number of doctors
who have ever applied to h and are acceptable to h is strictly smaller than the target
capacity of h. This implies that any doctor who applied to h and was rejected in the ex-
ible deferred acceptance algorithm is unacceptable to h. In particular d is unacceptable,
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Hence, there exists no pair of a doctor and a hospital who want to deviate from the
matching generated by the exible deferred acceptance mechanism, if the number of doc-
tors currently matched with the hospital is strictly less than its target. The conclusion of
the theorem applies even if the regional capacity is already binding, thus this property is
not implied by stability.
7. Discussion
This section provides several discussions that relate our model and results to existing
theories. In Subsection 7.1, we show that there does not necessarily exist side-optimal
stable matchings, that is, matchings that are preferred by all doctors or by all hospitals.
In Subsection 7.2, we consider the rural hospital theorem of Roth (1986) and show that
its conclusion does not hold in our environment. This subsection also discusses how the
exible deferred acceptance mechanism works in terms of the \match rate," the ratio of the
number of doctors matched to some hospital to the total number of doctors. Subsection 7.3
considers the generalization of stability and the exible deferred acceptance mechanism,
and Subsection 7.4 examines the welfare eect of dierent choices of target capacities and
picking orders over hospitals in the exible deferred acceptance mechanism. Subsection
7.5 considers \oor constraints" instead of \ceiling constraints" (regional caps).
7.1. Nonexistence of Side-Optimal Stable Matchings. There does not necessarily
exist a doctor-optimal stable matching (a stable matching unanimously preferred to every
stable matching by all doctors). Neither does there exist a hospital-optimal stable match-
ing. To see this point, consider the environment presented in Example 4, and assume that














Clearly, d1 and h1 strictly prefer  to 0 while d2 and h2 strictly prefer 0 to . Thus there
exists neither a doctor-optimal stable matching nor a hospital-optimal stable matching.
Moreover, this example shows that there exists neither a doctor-pessimal stable matching
nor a hospital-pessimal stable matching in general.
7.2. The Rural Hospital Theorem and The Match Rate. In this subsection, we
examine the celebrated rural hospital theorem of Roth (1986). The theorem states that,
in a matching model without regional caps, any hospital that fails to 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in one stable matching is matched to an identical set of doctors in all stable matchings.
It also states that the set of unmatched doctors is identical across all stable matchings.
The theorem is of particular interest when we consider allocating a sucient number of
doctors to rural areas. Although the rural hospital theorem might suggest that increasing
the number of doctors in a particular set of hospitals is impossible, the conclusion of the
theorem does not necessarily hold in our context with regional caps, even with the most
stringent concept of strong stability. The following example makes this point clear.
Example 7 (The conclusion of the rural hospital theorem does not hold). There is one
region r with regional cap qr = 1, in which two hospitals, h1 and h2, reside. Each hospital
h has a capacity of qh = 1. Suppose that there are two doctors, d1 and d2. We assume
the following preferences:
h1: d1; h2: d2;
d1: h1; d2: h2:














Notice that hospital h1 lls its capacity in macthing  while it does not do so in matching
0. Also, d1 is matched to a hospital in matching  while it does not in matching 0.
Hence both conclusions of the rural hospital theorem fail, even with the notion of strong
stability.
One might suspect that, although the rural hospital theorem dos not apply, it might
be the case that each region attracts the same number of doctors in any strongly stable
matchings. The following example shows that this is not true.
Example 8 (The number of doctors matched to hospitals in a rural region may be
dierent in dierent strongly stable matchings). We modify Example 7 by adding one
more region r0, which we interpret here for the sake of discussion as a \rural region."
Region r0 has the regional cap of qr0 = 1, and one hospital, h3, resides in it. Suppose that
h3 has a capacity of qh3 = 1. The preferences are modied as follows:
h1: d1; h2: d2; h3: d1;
d1: h1;h3; d2: h2:28 YUICHIRO KAMADA AND FUHITO KOJIMA
It is straightforward to check that there are two strongly stable matchings,
 =
 
h1 h2 h3 ;










Thus the hospital in rural region r0 does not attract any doctors in matching , while it
attracts one doctor in matching 0.
Hence, when the number of doctors matched to hospitals in rural regions matters, the
choice of a mechanism is an important issue, in the presence of regional caps.
Related to the rural hospital theorem is the notion of \match rate," which is the ratio
of the number of doctors matched to some hospital to the total number of doctors. The
match rate seems to be a measure that many people care about. For example, match
rates are listed on the annual reports published by the NRMP and the JRMP.28 This is
perhaps because the match rate is an easy measure for participants to understand.29
Although it would be desirable if a mechanism could select a matching that has the
maximum match rate among the stable matchings, there exists no mechanism that always
does so and is strategy-proof for doctors. In particular, our exible deferred acceptance
mechanism does not select a matching that has the maximum match rate among stable
matchings. We rst demonstrate in Example 9 that the exible deferred acceptance
mechanism does not always produce a stable matching with the maximal match rate.
The second example, Example 10, shows that there does not exist a mechanism that is
strategy-proof for doctors and always selects a matching with the maximum match rate
among stable matchings.
Example 9 (The exible deferred acceptance mechanism does not necessarily select a
matching with the highest match rate among stable matchings). Take the same example
as in Example 8. Also, let the target prole be ( q1;  q2) = (1;0). Then, the exible deferred
acceptance mechanism always selects a matching  dened in Example 8. But this has
a match rate of 1=2, while the other matching, namely 0 dened in Example 8, has a
match rate of 1.
28For instance, see National Resident Matching Market (2010) and Japan Residency Matching Program
(2009b).
29The ease of understanding may not be a persuasive reason for economic theorists to care about the
match rates, but it seems to be a crucial issue for market designers. For a mechanism to work well in
practice, it is essential that people are willing to participate in the mechanism. To this end, providing
information in an accessible manner, as in the form of the match rates, seems to be of great importance.IMPROVING EFFICIENCY IN MATCHING MARKETS WITH REGIONAL CAPS 29
It is an unfortunate fact that the exible deferred acceptance mechanism does not
necessarily maximize the match rate within stable matchings. A natural next question
is whether there is any reasonable mechanism that can do so. The following example
shows that the answer is negative in the sense that such a requirement is inconsistent
with strategy-proofness.
Example 10 (No mechanism that is strategy-proof for doctors can always select a match-
ing with the highest match rate among stable matchings). Modify the environment in
Example 8 as follows:
h1: d1; h2: d2; h3: d1;d2;
d1: h1;h3; d2: h2;h3;
with everything else unchanged. Let  qh1 =  qh2 =  qh3 = 0. Notice that, given these
preferences, there are two stable matchings, namely  with d1 = h1 and d2 = h3, and
0 with 0
d1 = h3 and 0
d2 = h2. Take a mechanism that always selects a matching with
the highest match rate among the stable matchings, if any. We show that this mechanism
cannot be strategy-proof. Since both  and 0 have match rate of 1, both can potentially
be chosen by the mechanism. Suppose that the mechanism chooses . Then, doctor d2
has an incentive to misreport her preferences: If she reports that hospital h2 is the only
acceptable match, then given the new prole of the preferences, the only stable matching
that maximizes the match rate among stable matchings is 0. Since 0
d2 d2 d2, doctor
d2 indeed has an incentive to misreport. A symmetric argument can be made for the case
in which the mechanism chooses 0 given the true preference prole. Hence, there does
not exist a mechanism that is strategy-proof for doctors and always selects a matching
with the highest match rate among stable matchings.
Despite the above negative results, there are bounds on the match rates in the matchings
produced by the exible deferred acceptance mechanism. More specically, the following
comparison can be made with the JRMP mechanism as well as with the (unconstrained)
deferred acceptance algorithm without regional caps:
Theorem 3. For any preference prole,
(1) Each doctor d 2 D weakly prefers a matching produced by the deferred acceptance
mechanism to the one produced by the exible deferred acceptance mechanism to
the one produced by the JRMP mechanism.
(2) If a doctor is unmatched in the deferred acceptance mechanism, she is unmatched in
the exible deferred acceptance mechanism. If a doctor is unmatched in the exible
deferred acceptance mechanism, she is unmatched in the JRMP mechanism.30 YUICHIRO KAMADA AND FUHITO KOJIMA
Notice that part (2) of the above result, which is a direct corollary of part (1), implies
that the match rate is weakly higher in the deferred acceptance mechanism than in the
exible deferred acceptance mechanism, which in turn has a weakly higher match rate
than the JRMP mechanism.30
Theorem 3 suggests that the exible deferred acceptance mechanism matches reason-
ably many doctors. Characterizing stable mechanisms that achieve strategy-proofness for
doctors and match \as many doctors as possible," as well as studying their relationship
with the exible deferred acceptance mechanism, is an interesting open question.
7.3. More General Stability Concept and Algorithm. As mentioned in Section 5,
the notion of stability is based on the idea that if the result of a move of a doctor within a
region does not equalize the excess over the target capacities than the current matching,
it is not deemed as a valid deviation. We argued that this is not a necessary choice of the
concept as, for example, it may be natural to suppose that a hospital with capacity 20 is
entitled to twice as many doctors (over the target) as a hospital with capacity 10. There
may be other criteria, and a natural question is what kind of criteria can be accommodated
in general.
Appendix B generalizes the concept of stability that takes this issue into account. We
also propose a generalized version of the exible deferred acceptance mechanism. We
show that the generalized exible deferred acceptance algorithm nds a stable matching
as dened more generally, and it is group strategy-proof.
7.4. Welfare Eects of Picking Orders and Targets. The exible deferred accep-
tance algorithm follows a certain picking order of hospitals in each region when there are
some doctors remaining to be tentatively matched after hospitals have kept doctors up
to their target capacities. One issue around the mechanism is how to decide the picking
order. One natural conjecture may be that choosing earlier (that is, having an earlier
order in the exible deferred acceptance algorithm) benets a hospital. This would be a
problematic property: If choosing earlier benets the hospital, then how to order hospitals
will be a sensitive policy issue to cope with because each hospital would have incentives
to be granted an early picking order. Fortunately, the conjecture is not true, as shown in
the following example.31 The example also shows that the dierent choices of order result
30For an example in which the deferred acceptance mechnism and the exible deferred acceptance
mechanism dier in terms of match rates, see Example 4 (with an arbitrary target capacity prole). For
the exible deferred accceptance mechanism and the JRMP mechanism, see Example 1.
31This observation is reminiscent of \capacity manipulations" introduced by S onmez (1997). He shows
that stable mechanisms such as the deferred acceptance mechanism are vulnerable to underreporting ofIMPROVING EFFICIENCY IN MATCHING MARKETS WITH REGIONAL CAPS 31
in dierent stable matchings, thus the choice of order does matter for the algorithm's
outcome.
Example 11 (Ordering a hospital earlier may make it worse o). Let there be two
hospitals, h1 and h2, in region r1, and h3 in region r2. Suppose that qh1 = 2,  qh1 = 1,
qh2 = qh3 = 1, and  qh2 =  qh3 = 0. Regional caps of r1 is two and that for r2 is one.
Preferences are
h1: d1;d4;d2; h2: d3; h3: d2;d1;
d1: h3;h1; d2: h1;h3; d3: h2; d4: h1:
(1) Assume that h1 is ordered earlier than h2. In that case, in the exible deferred
acceptance mechanism, d1 applies to h3, d2 and d4 apply to h1, and d3 applies to
h2. d2 and d4 are accepted while d3 is rejected. The matching nalizes.
(2) Assume that h1 is ordered after h2. In that case, in the exible deferred acceptance
mechanism, d1 applies to h3, d2 and d4 apply to h1, and d3 applies to h2. But
now d2 is rejected while d3 is accepted. Then d2 applies to h3, displacing d1 from
h3. Then d1 applies to h1. d1 is accepted, displacing d4 from h1. The matching
nalzies.
First, notice that hospital h2 is better o in case (2) than in case (1). Thus being ordered
earlier helps h2 in this example. However, if h1 prefers fd1g to fd2;d4g (which is consistent
with the assumption that hospital preferences are responsive with capacities), then h1 is
also made better o in case (2) than in case (1). Thus being ordered later helps h1 if she
prefers fd1g to fd2;d4g. Therefore, the eect of picking order on hospitals' welfare is not
monotone.
A related concern is about what could be called \target monotonicity." That is, keeping
everything else constant, does an increase of the target of a hospital make it better o
under the exible deferred acceptance mechanism? If so, then hospitals would have strong
incentives to inuence policy makers to give them large targets. The following example
shows that target monotonicity is not necessarily true.
Example 12 (Target monotonicity may fail). Consider the market that is identical to
the one in Example 11, except that the target of h1 is now decreased to 0, with the order
such that h1 chooses before h2. Then h1 is matched to fd1g under the exible deferred
capacities by hospitals. Konishi and  Unver (2006), Kojima (2007b), and Kesten (2008) study conditions
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acceptance mechanism. Therefore, if h1 prefers fd1g to fd2;d4g, then h1 is made better
o when its target capacity is smaller.
7.5. Floor Constraints. The present paper oers a practical solution for the Japanese
resident matching problem with regional caps. However, the regional cap may not be an
ultimate objective per se, but a means to allocate medical residents \evenly" to dierent
areas. Setting a cap {a ceiling constraint on the number of residents in a region{ is an
obvious approach to this desideratum, but there may be other possible regulations. For
example, one might wonder setting oor constraints, as opposed to cap constraints, would
be an easier and more direct solution. However, there are reasons that oor constraints
may be dicult to use. First, even the existence of an individually rational matching
that respects oor constraints is not guaranteed. For example, if no doctor nds any
hospital in a certain region to be acceptable, then satisfying a positive oor constraint for
the region results in an individually irrational matching (doctors matched with hospitals
in the region would just reject taking the job). Second, even if an individually rational
matching exists, it is not clear whether a stable matching exists. In fact, an appropriate
denition of stability in the presence of oor constraints is unclear.32
8. Conclusion
This paper showed that the current matching mechanism used in Japan may result
in avoidable ineciency and instability despite its similarity to the celebrated deferred
acceptance mechanism. We proposed a new mechanism, called the exible deferred ac-
ceptance mechanism. This mechanism is (group) strategy-proof, generates a stable and
ecient matching, and places more doctors to hospitals than the current mechanism.
With regional caps there may not necessarily exist a unique \right" notion of stability
concept, and hence there may not necessarily exist the unique choice of the mechanism.
The choice would depend on the government's welfare and distributional goals, and there
is room for the government to select a particular stable matching based on such goals. We
hope that this paper serves as a basis for achieving such goals and, more broadly, that it
contributes to the general agenda of matching/market design theory to address specic
issues arising in practical problems.
We intentionally refrained from judging the merit of imposing regional caps itself (ex-
cept for a certain welfare result in Theorem 3). We took this approach because our model
does not explicitly include patients or ethical concern by general populace, which may be
underlying arguments for increasing doctors in rural areas. Similarly, we did not analyze
32A similar point is made in the context of school choice by Ehlers (2010).IMPROVING EFFICIENCY IN MATCHING MARKETS WITH REGIONAL CAPS 33
other policies such as subsidies to incentivize residents to work in rural area.33 Instead,
we took an approach in the new tradition of market design research, in which one regards
constraints such as fairness and repugnance as requirements to be respected and oers
solutions consistent with them.34 That is, regional caps seem to stay as a political reality,
so we believe that it is important to take them as given and try to provide a practical
solution.
The paper opens new avenues for further research topics. First, as mentioned before,
strategy-proofness for every agent including hospitals is impossible even without regional
caps if we also require stability. However, truthtelling is an approximately optimal strategy
under the deferred acceptance mechanism in large markets under some assumptions (Roth
and Peranson, 1999; Immorlica and Mahdian, 2005; Kojima and Pathak, 2009). Although
such an analysis requires a much more specialized model structure than what this paper
has and is outside the scope of this paper, approximate incentive compatibility similar to
these papers may hold.
Second, studying more general constraint structures may be interesting. For instance,
one could consider a hierarchy of regional caps, say one cap for a prefecture and one for
each district within the prefecture. Or society may desire to regulate the total number
of doctors practicing in certain specialties as well as in a region. One conjecture is that
our results generalize as long as the constraint structure forms a hierarchy as analyzed
by Milgrom (2009) and Budish, Che, Kojima, and Milgrom (2010). This paper focused
on the simple setting of (one layer of) regional caps because that is the existing structure
in the motivating problem of Japanese residency matching, but a generalization may
become practically important if more complex constraints become politically possible in
the future.
Third, it would be desirable to obtain the actual data to test how well the exible
deferred acceptance mechanism does relative to the JRMP mechanism. We are planning
to work on this as a future research topic.
Finally, it would be nice to study markets that have similar structures to the one in this
paper. Markets mentioned in the Introduction are natural candidates for such a study. We
33This is not because subsidies are not important. In fact, subsidy is used to attract residents to rural
areas is many countries such as the United States and Japan. However, there are political pressures
to restrict the use of subsidies in the Japanese medical market. Beginning in 2011, for instance, the
government will reduce subsidies to residency programs that pay annual salaries of more than 7,200,000
yen (about 85,000 U.S. dollars) to residents. In any case, our analysis is applicable given participants'
preferences which reect subsidies, thus our method can be employed on top of subsidies.
34This approach is eloquently advocated by Roth (2007b).34 YUICHIRO KAMADA AND FUHITO KOJIMA
expect some general insights will carry over to such settings, while market-specic details
should be carefully taken into account when we consider dierent markets in dierent
political or cultural environments.
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Appendix A. Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. Let  be a stable matching and assume, for contradiction, that  is not ecient.
Then there exists a feasible matching 0 that Pareto dominates , that is, there is a
feasible matching 0 such that 0
i i i for all i 2 D [ H, with at least one being strict.
Noting that matching is bilateral, this implies that there exists a doctor d 2 D with
0
d d d. Since  is a stable matching, d d ; and hence 0
d 6= ;, so 0
d 2 H. Denote
h = 0
d. Since  is a stable matching, h d d implies one of the following:
(1) ; h d.
(2) jhj = qh and d0 h d for all d0 2 h.
(3) jHrj = qr for r such that h 2 Hr and d0 h d for all d0 2 h.
Suppose ; h d. Then, if jhj = qh, then there is a doctor d00 2 0
h n h such that
d00 h d0 for some d0 2 h (otherwise, by responsiveness of the preference of h, it follows
that h h 0
h). Then, since  is stable, d00 d00 h = 0
d00, contradicting the assumption
that 0 Pareto dominates . If jhj < qh, then there should be a doctor d00 2 0
h n h
such that d00 h ; (otherwise, by responsiveness of the preference of h, it follows that
h h 0
h). Then, since  is stable, d00 d00 h = 0
d00, contradicting the assumption that
0 Pareto dominates .
Suppose jhj = qh and d0 h d for all d0 2 h. Then there should be a doctor d00 2 0
hnh
such that d00 h d0 for some d0 2 h (otherwise, by responsiveness of the preference of h,
it follows that h h 0
h). Then, since  is stable, d00 d00 h = 0
d00, contradicting the
assumption that 0 Pareto dominates .
Suppose jHrj = qr for r such that h 2 Hr and d0 h d for all d0 2 h. Then, if
j0
hj  jhj, then there should be a doctor d00 2 0
hnh such that d00 h d0 for some d0 2 h
(otherwise, by responsiveness of the preference of h, it follows that h h 0
h). Then,
since  is stable, d00 d00 h = 0
d00, contradicting the assumption that 0 Pareto dominates
. If j0
hj > jhj, then since jHrj = qr, there exists a hospital h0 2 Hr with j0
h0j < jh0j.
This, since 0
h0 h0 h0 as 0 Pareto dominates , implies that there should be a doctor
d00 2 0
h0 n h0 such that d00 h0 d0 for some d0 2 h0 (otherwise, by responsiveness of the
preference of h0, it follows that h0 h0 0
h0). Then, since  is stable, d00 d00 h0 = 0
d00,
contradicting the assumption that 0 Pareto dominates . 
Appendix B. A general model
Let r be a weak ordering over nonnegative-valued integer vectors Wr := fw =
(wh)h2Hrjwh 2 Z+g. We write w r w0 if and only if w r w0 holds but w0 r w
does not. That is, r is a binary relation that is complete and transitive (but notIMPROVING EFFICIENCY IN MATCHING MARKETS WITH REGIONAL CAPS 41
necessarily antisymmetric). Given r, a function ~ Chr : Wr ! Wr is an associated
quasi choice rule if ~ Chr(x) 2 argmaxrfyjy  xg for any non-negative integer vector
x = (xh)h2Hr.35 Throughout we require that the quasi choice rule ~ Chr be consistent,
that is, Chr(x)  y  x ! Chr(y) = Chr(x). This is a mild condition that the choice is
made in a consistent manner: If Chr(x) is chosen at x and the supply decreases to y  x
but Chr(x) is still available under y, then the same choice Chr(x) should be made under
y as well. Note that there may be more than one quasi choice rule associated with a given
weak ordering r because the set argmaxrfyjy  xg may not be a singleton for some
r and x. Throught we assume that the regional preference r satises some regularity
conditions as described below.
(1) (a) w0 r w if wh > qh  w0
h for some h 2 Hr and w0
h0 = wh0 for all h0 6= h, and
(b) w0 r w if
P




These properties are mild and simply say that the region's preference should be
such that it prefers the total number of doctors in the region to be at most its
regional cap and it desires no hospital to be forced to be assigned more doctors
than its real capacity. This condition implies that, for any y, the component
[ ~ Chr(y)]h of ~ Chr(y) for h satises [ ~ Chr(y)]h  qh for each h 2 Hr, that is, the
capacity constraint for each hospital is respected, and
P
h2Hr( ~ Chr(y))h  qr, that
is, the regional cap is respected, in the (quasi) choice by the region.
(2) If y  x  qHr := (qh)h2Hr, and
P
h2Hr xh  qr, then x r y. This condition
formalizes the idea that the region prefers to ll as many positions in hospitals
in the region as possible so long as doing so does not lead to violation of the
hospitals' real capacities or the regional cap. This requirement implies that any
associated quasi choice rule is acceptant (Kojima and Manea, 2009), that is, for
each x, if there exists h such that [Chr(x)]h < minfqh;xhg, then jChr(x)j = qr.
This condition captures the idea that the social planner should not waste caps
allocated to the region: If there exists some doctor who is not accepted by a
hospital even though she is acceptable to the hospital and the hospital's capacity
is not binding, then the regional cap should be binding. This property seems to
be a minimal requirement.
35For any two vectors x = (xh)h2Hr and y = (yh)h2Hr, we write x  y if and only if xh  yh for all
h 2 Hr. We write x  y if and only if x  y and xh < yh for at least one h 2 Hr. For any W0
r  Wr,
argmaxr W0
r is the set of vectors w 2 W0
r such that w r w0 for all w0 2 W0
r.42 YUICHIRO KAMADA AND FUHITO KOJIMA
The weak ordering r is substitutable if there exists an associated quasi choice rule
~ Chr that satises
w  w




0 ) [ ~ Chr(w)]h  minf[ ~ Chr(w
0)]h;whg for every h 2 Hr. (B.1)
Vectors such as w and w0 are interpreted to be supplies of doctors, but they only specify
how many doctors apply to each hospital and no information is given as to who these
doctors are. Intuitively, this condition says that the number of accepted doctors at a
hospital can increase only when the hospital has accepted all acceptable doctors under
the original supply prole. Formally, condition (B.1) is equivalent to
w  w
0 and [ ~ Chr(w)]h < [ ~ Chr(w
0)]h ) [ ~ Chr(w)]h = wh: (B.2)
To see that condition (B.1) implies condition (B.2), suppose that w  w0 and [ ~ Chr(w)]h <
[ ~ Chr(w0)]h. These assumptions and condition (B.1) imply [ ~ Chr(w)]h  wh: Since [ ~ Chr(w)]h 
wh holds by the denition of ~ Chr, this implies [ ~ Chr(w)]h = wh. To see that condition
(B.2) implies condition (B.1), suppose that w  w0. If [ ~ Chr(w)]h  [ ~ Chr(w0)]h, the conclu-
sion of (B.1) is trivially satised. If [ ~ Chr(w)]h < [ ~ Chr(w0)]h, then condition (B.2) implies
[ ~ Chr(w)]h = wh, thus the conclusion of (B.1) is satised.
This denition of substitutability is analogous to persistence by Alkan and Gale (2003),
who dene the condition on a choice function in a slightly dierent context. While our
denition is similar to substitutability as dened in standard matching models, there are
two dierences: (i) it is now dened on a region as opposed to a hospital, and (ii) it is
dened over vectors that only specify how many doctors apply to hospitals in the region,
and it does not distinguish dierent doctors. Given (r)r2R, stability is dened as follows.
Denition 4. A matching  is stable if it is feasible, individually rational, and if (d;h)
is a blocking pair then (i) jr(h)j = qr(h), (ii) d0 h d for all d0 2 h, and
(iii') either d = 2 Hr(h) or w r(h) w0,
where wh0 = jh0j for all h0 2 Hr(h) and w0
h = wh + 1, w0
d = wd   1 and wh0 = wh0 for all
other h0 2 Hr(h):
Given the above properties, we can think of the following (generalized) exible deferred
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The Flexible Deferred Acceptance Algorithm For each region r, x an associated
quasi choice rule ~ Chr which satises condition (B.1). Note that the assumption that r
is substitutable assures the existence of such a quasi choice rule.
(1) Begin with an empty matching, that is, a matching  such that d = ; for all
d 2 D.
(2) Choose a doctor d arbitrarily who is currently not tentatively matched to any
hospital and who has not applied to all acceptable hospitals yet. If such a doctor
does not exist, then terminate the algorithm.
(3) Let d apply to the most preferred hospital  h at d among the hospitals that have
not rejected d so far. If d is unacceptable to  h, then reject this doctor and go
back to Step 2. Otherwise, let r be the region such that  h 2 Hr and dene vector
x = (xh)h2Hr by
(a) x h is the number of doctors currently held at  h plus one, and
(b) xh is the number of doctors currently held at h if h 6=  h.
(4) Each hospital h 2 Hr considers the new applicant d (if h =  h) and doctors who
are temporarily held from the previous step together. It holds its ( ~ Chr(x))h most
preferred applicants among them temporarily and rejects the rest (so doctors held
at this step may be rejected in later steps). Go back to Step 2.
We dene the exible deferred acceptance mechanism to be a mechanism that
produces, for each input, the matching at the termination of the above algorithm.
B.1. Associated Matching Model with Contracts. It is useful to relate our model
to a (many-to-many) matching model with contracts (Hateld and Milgrom, 2005). Let
there be two types of agents, doctors in D and regions in R. Note that we regard a
region, as opposed to a hospital, as an agent in this model. There is a set of contracts
X = D  H.
We assume that, for each doctor d, any set of contracts with cardinality two or more
is unacceptable. For each doctor d, her preference d over (fdg  H) [ f;g is given as
follows.36 We assume (d;h) d (d;h0) in this model if and only if h d h0 in the original
model, and (d;h) d ; in this model if and only if h d ; in the original model.
For each region r 2 R, we assume that the region has a preference r with an associated
choice rule Chr() over all subsets of D  Hr. For any X0  D  Hr, let w(X0) :=
(wh(X0))h2Hr be the vector such that wh(X0) = jf(d;h) 2 X0jd h ;gj. For each X0, the
36We abuse notation and use the same notation d for preferences of doctor d both in the original
model and in the associated model with contracts.44 YUICHIRO KAMADA AND FUHITO KOJIMA















That is, each hospital h 2 Hr chooses its ( ~ Chr(w(X0)))h most preferred contracts available
under X0.
We extend the domain of the choice rule to the entire class of all subsets of D  H by
setting Chr(X0) = Chr(f(d;h) 2 X0jh 2 Hrg) for any X0  D  H.
Denition 5 (Hateld and Milgrom (2005)). Choice rule Chr() satises the substitutes
condition if there does not exist contracts x;x0 2 X and a set of contracts X0  X such
that x0 = 2 Chr(X0 [ fx0g) and x0 2 Chr(X0 [ fx;x0g).
In other words, contracts are substitutes if the addition of a contract to the choice set
never induces a hospital to take a contract it previously rejected. Hateld and Milgrom
(2005) show that there exists a stable allocation (dened in Denition 7) when contracts
are substitutes for every hospital.
Denition 6 (Hateld and Milgrom (2005)). Choice rule Chr() satises the law of
aggregate demand if for all X0  X00  X, jChr(X0)j  jChr(X00)j.
Proposition 2. Suppose that r is substitutable. Then choice rule Chr() dened above
satises the substitutes condition and the law of aggregate demand.
Proof. Fix a region r 2 R. Let X0 be a subset of contracts and x = (d;h) 2 X nX0 where
h 2 Hr. Let w = w(X0) and w0 = w(X0 [ x). To show that Chr satises the substitutes
condition, we consider a number of cases as follows.
(1) Suppose that ; h d. Then w0 = w and, for each h0 2 Hr, the set of acceptable
doctors available at X0 [ x is identical to the one at X0. Therefore, by inspection
of the denition of Chr, we have Chr(X0[x) = Chr(X0), satisfying the conclusion
of the substitutes condition in this case.
(2) Suppose that d h ;.
(a) Consider a hospital h0 2 Hr n h. Note that we have w0
h0 = wh0. This and
the inequality [ ~ Chr(w0)]h0  w0
h0 (which always holds by the denition of
~ Chr) imply that [ ~ Chr(w0)]h0  wh0: Thus we obtain minf[ ~ Chr(w0)]h0;wh0g =
[ ~ Chr(w0)]h0: Since w0  w and condition (B.1) holds, this implies that
[ ~ Chr(w)]h0  [ ~ Chr(w
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Also observe that the set fd0 2 Dj(d0;h0) 2 X0g is identical to fd0 2 Dj(d0;h0) 2
X0 [xg, that is, the sets of doctors that are available to hospital h0 are iden-
tical under X0 and X0 [ x. This fact, inequality (B.3), and the denition of
Chr imply that if x0 = (d0;h0) = 2 Chr(X0), then x0 = 2 Chr(X0 [ x), obtaining
the conclusion for the substitute condition in this case.
(b) Consider hospital h.
(i) Suppose that [ ~ Chr(w)]h  [ ~ Chr(w0)]h. In this case we follow an argu-
ment similar to (but slightly dierent from) Case (2a): Note that the
set fd0 2 Dj(d0;h) 2 X0g is a subset of fd0 2 Dj(d0;h) 2 X0 [ xg, that
is, the set of doctors that are available to hospital h under X0 is smaller
than under X0 [ x. These properties and the denition of Chr imply
that if x0 = (d0;h) 2 X0nChr(X0), then x0 2 X0nChr(X0[x), obtaining
the conclusion for the substitute condition in this case.
(ii) Suppose that [ ~ Chr(w)]h < [ ~ Chr(w0)]h. This assumption and (B.2) imply
[ ~ Chr(w)]h = wh. Thus, by the denition of Chr, any contract (d0;h) 2
X0 such that d0 h ; is in Chr(X0). Equivalently, if x0 = (d0;h) 2
X0 n Chr(X0), then ; h d0. Then, again by the denition of Chr, it
follows that x0 = 2 Chr(X0[x) for any contract x0 = (d0;h) 2 X0nChr(X0).
Thus we obtain the conclusion of the substitute condition in this case.
To show that Chr satises the law of aggregate demand, simply note that ~ Chr is acceptant
by assumption. This leads to the desired conclusion. 
A subset X0 of X is said to be an allocation if it is individually rational for each agent,
that is, (1) for any d 2 D, jf(d;h) 2 X0jh 2 Hgj  1, and if (d;h) 2 X0 then h d ;, and
(2) Chr(X0) = X0 for any X0  D  Hr.
Denition 7. A set of contracts X0  X is a stable allocation if it is an allocation
and
(1) [r2RChr(X0) = X0; and
(2) there exists no region r 2 R, hospital h 2 Hr, and a doctor d 2 D such that
(d;h) d x and (d;h) 2 Chr(X0[f(d;h)g), where x is the contract that d receives
at X0 if any and ; otherwise.
When condition (2) is violated by some (d;h), we say that (d;h) blocks X0 or (d;h) is
a block of X0.
Given any allocation X0, dene a corresponding matching (X0) in the original
model by setting d(X0) = h if and only if (d;h) 2 X0 and d(X0) = ; if and only if no46 YUICHIRO KAMADA AND FUHITO KOJIMA
contract associated with d is in X0. Since each doctor regards any set of contracts with
cardinality of at least two as unacceptable, each doctor receives at most one contract at
X0 and hence (X0) is well dened for any allocation X0.
Proposition 3. If X0 is a stable allocation in the associated model with contracts, then
the corresponding matching (X0) is a stable matching in the original model.
Proof. Suppose that X0 is a stable allocation in the associated model with contracts and
denote  := (X0). Individual rationality of  is obvious from the construction of .
To show that there is no blocking pair for , assume that h d d for some d 2 D and
h 2 H. Further assume that d h ; and, moreover, jhj < qh or d h d0 for some d0 2 h
in negation of conditions (a) and (b) of the denition of stability (Denition 4). Let r
be a region such that h 2 Hr. By the denition of stability, it suces to show that the
following conditions (B.4) and (B.5) hold if d 62 Hr, and (B.4), (B.5) and (B.6) hold if
d 2 Hr,
jHrj = qr; (B.4)
d0 h d for all d0 2 h, (B.5)
w r w0; (B.6)
where w = (wh)h2Hr is dened by wh0 = jh0j for all h0 2 Hr while w0 = (w0
h)h2Hr is
dened by w0
h = wh + 1, w0
d = wd   1 (if d 2 Hr) and wh0 = wh0 for all other h0 2 Hr.
Claim 1. Conditions (B.4) and (B.5) hold (irrespectively of whether d 2 Hr or not).
Proof. First note that the assumption that h d d implies that (d;h) d x where x
denotes the (possibly empty) contract that d signs under X0. Let w00 = (w00
h)h2Hr be
dened by w00
h = wh + 1 and w00
h0 = wh0 for all other h0 2 Hr.
(1) Assume, for contradiction, that condition (B.5) is violated, that is, d h d0 for
some d0 2 h. First, by consistency of ~ Chr, we have [ ~ Chr(w00)]h  [ ~ Chr(w)]h.37
This implies that weakly more contracts involving h are signed at X0 [ (d;h)
than at X0. This property, together with the assumptions that d h d0 and that
37To show this claim, assume for contradiction that [ ~ Chr(w00)]h < [ ~ Chr(w)]h. Then, [ ~ Chr(w00)]h <
[ ~ Chr(w)]h  wh: Moreover, since w00
h0 = wh0 for every h0 6= h by construction of w00, it follows that
[ ~ Chr(w00)]h0  w00
h0 = wh0: Combining these inequalities, we have that ~ Chr(w00)  w. Also we have
w  w00 by the denition of w00, so it follows that ~ Chr(w00)  w  w00: Thus, by consistency of ~ Chr, we
obtain ~ Chr(w00) = ~ Chr(w), a contradiction to the assumption [ ~ Chr(w00)]h < [ ~ Chr(w)]h.IMPROVING EFFICIENCY IN MATCHING MARKETS WITH REGIONAL CAPS 47
(d0;h) 2 X0 imply that (d;h) 2 Chr(X0[(d;h)).38 Thus, together with the above-
mentioned property that (d;h) d x, (d;h) is a block of X0 in the associated
model of matching with contract, contradicting the assumption that X0 is a stable
allocation.
(2) Assume, for contradiction, that condition (B.4) is violated, so that jHrj 6= qr.
Then, since jHrj  qr by the construction of  = (X0) and the assumption that
X0 is an allocation, it follows that jHrj < qr. Then (d;h) 2 Chr(X0 [ (d;h))
because,










h2Hr wh + 1  qr. Moreover, jhj < qh by assumption and (B.5), so
w00
h = jhj + 1  qh. These properties and the assumption that ~ Chr is accep-
tant imply that ~ Chr(w00) = w00. In particular, this implies that all contracts
(d0;h) 2 X0 [ (d;h) such that d0 h ; is chosen at Chr(X0 [ (d;h)).
Thus, together with the above-mentioned property that (d;h) d x, (d;h) is a
block of X0 in the associated model of matching with contract, contradicting the
assumption that X0 is a stable allocation.

To nish the proof of the theorem suppose that d 2 Hr and, for contradiction, that
(B.6) fails, that is, w0 r w. Then it should be the case that [ ~ Chr(w00)]h = w00
h = wh+1 =
jhj + 1.39 Also we have jhj < qh and hence jhj + 1  qh and d h ;, so
(d;h) 2 Chr(X
0 [ (d;h)):
This relationship, together with the assumption that h d d, and hence (d;h) d x, is a
contradiction to the assumption that X0 is stable in the associated model with contracts.

38The proof of this claim is as follows. Chr(X0) induces each hospital h0 2 Hr to select its [Chr(X0)]h0
most preferred contracts while Chr(X0 [ (d;h)) induces each hospital to select a weakly larger number
[Chr(X0 [ (d;h))]h0 of its most preferred contracts. Since (d0;h) is selected as one of [Chr(X0)]h0 most
preferred contracts for h at X0 and d h d0, we conclude that (d;h) should be one of [Chr(X0[(d;h))]h0 
[Chr(X0)]h0 most preferred contracts at X0 [ (d;h), thus selected at X0 [ (d;h).
39To show this claim, assume for contradiction that [ ~ Chr(w00)]h  wh. Then, since w00
h0 = wh0 for
any h0 6= h by the denition of w00, it follows that ~ Chr(w00)  w  w00: Thus by consistency of ~ Chr, we
obtain ~ Chr(w00) = ~ Chr(w): But ~ Chr(w) = w because X0 is a stable allocation in the associated model of
matching with contracts, so ~ Chr(w00) = w. This is a contradiction because w0  w00 and w0 r w while
~ Chr(w00) 2 argmaxrfw000jw000  w00g:48 YUICHIRO KAMADA AND FUHITO KOJIMA
Since Chr() satises the substitutes condition for each r, there exists a doctor-optimal
(doctor-pessimal) stable allocation in the matching model with contracts, that is, a
stable allocation that every doctor weakly prefers to every other stable allocation (Hateld
and Milgrom, 2005). Moreover, if choice rules of all regions satisfy substitutes and the
law of aggregate demand, then the doctor-optimal stable mechanism (the mechanism that
produces the doctor-optimal stable allocation for any input) is group strategy-proof. In
particular, the doctor-optimal stable mechanism is strategy-proof.
We will show that the exible deferred acceptance mechanism is \isomorphic" to the
doctor-optimal stable mechanism in the model with contracts.
Proposition 4. Suppose that r is substitutable for every r 2 R. Then the doctor-optimal
stable allocation in the associated matching model with contracts, X0, exists. The relation
(X0) =  holds, where  is the matching produced by the exible deferred acceptance
mechanism.
Proof. First observe that the doctor-optimal stable allocation in matching with contracts
can be found by the cumulative oer process (Hateld and Milgrom, 2005; Hateld and
Kojima, 2009). Then, we observe that each step of the exible deferred acceptance al-
gorithm corresponds to a step of the cumulative oer process, that is, at each step, if
d proposes to h in exible deferred acceptance algorithm, then at the same step of the
cumulative oer process, contract (d;h) is proposed. Moreover, for each region, the set of
doctors accepted for hospitals in the region at the step of the exible deferred acceptance
algorithm corresponds to the set of contracts held by the region in the cumulative oer
process. 
Theorem 4. Suppose that r is substitutable for every r 2 R. Then the exible deferred
acceptance algorithm stops in nite steps. The mechanism produces a stable matching for
any input and is group strategy-proof for doctors.
Proof. Propositions 3 and 4 imply that the exible deferred acceptance algorithm nds a
stable matching in nite steps. Also, Proposition 2 and 4 imply that the exible deferred
acceptance mechanism is (group) strategy-proof for doctors, as the substitutes condition
and the law of aggregate demand imply that any mechanism that selects the doctor-
optimal stable allocation is (group) strategy-proof (Hateld and Milgrom, 2005; Hateld
and Kojima, 2008; Hateld and Kominers, 2010). 
B.2. Stability in The Main Text. Given the target capacity prole ( qh)h and the
weight vector w, de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the i'th lowest value (allowing repetition) of fwh    qhjh 2 Hrg (we suppress dependence
of  on  q). For example, if w = (wh1;wh2;wh3;wh4) = (2;4;7;2) and ( qh1;  qh2;  qh3;  qh4) =
(3;2;3;0), then 1(w) =  1;2(w) = 3(w) = 2;4(w) = 4.
Consider the regional preference r that compares the excess weights lexicographically.
More specically, let r be such that w r w0 if and only if there exists an index i 2
f1;2;:::;jHrjg such that j(w) = j(w0) for all j < i and i(w) > i(w0). The associated
weak regional preference r is dened by w r w0 if and only if w r w0 or (w) = (w0).
We call this a Rawlsian regional preference.
Proposition 5. Stability as dened in the main text (Denition 3) is a special case of the
general concept of stability in the Appendix (Denition 4) when the regional preferences
of each region are Rawlsian.
Proof. Let w be dened by wh0 = jh0j for each h0 2 Hr and w0 by w0
h = wh + 1, w0
d =
wd   1, and w0
h0 = wh0 for all h0 2 Hr n fh;dg. It suces to show that w r w0 if and
only if jhj + 1    qh > jdj   1    qd.
Suppose that jhj+1  qh > jdj 1  qd. This means that wh+1  qh > wd  1  qd,
which is equivalent to either wh  qh = wd  1  qd or wh  qh  wd   qd: In the former
case, obviously (w) = (w0), so w r w0. In the latter case, fh0jw0
h0    qh0 < d    qdg =
fh0jwh0    qh0 < d    qdg [ fdg, and wh0 = w0
h0 for all h0 2 fh0jwh0    qh0 < d    qdg.
Thus we obtain w r w0.
If jhj+1   qh  jdj 1   qd, then obviously w0 r w. This completes the proof. 
Proposition 6. A Rawlsian preference is substitutable (and the choice rule described in
the exible deferred acceptance algorithm provides an associated choice rule).
Proof. It is clear that the quasi choice rule described in the exible deferred acceptance
algorithm, denoted ~ Chr, satises the substitutability, consistency and acceptance. Thus
in the following, we will show that ~ Chr indeed satises ~ Chr(w) 2 argmaxrfxjx  wg for
each w. Let w0 = ~ Chr(w). For contradiction, suppose that ~ Chr(w) = 2 argmaxrfxjx  wg
and consider an arbitrary w00 2 argmaxrfxjx  wg. Then we have w00 r w0, so there
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j j(w00)  qr.
Moreover, the assumption implies that there exists a hospital h such that w0
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j j(w0)  qr. Moreover, the as-
sumption implies that there exists a hospital h such that w00
h < w0
h  minfqh;whg.
Then, w000 dened by w000
h = w00
h + 1 and w000
h0 = w00
h0 for all h0 6= h satises w000  w





j j(w0). Then there exists some k such that k(w00) <
k(w0). Let l = minfkjk(w00) < k(w0)g be the smallest of such indices. Then
since l > i, we have i(w0) < i(w00)  l(w00) < l(w0). Thus it should be
the case that i(w0) + 2  l(w0). By the construction of ~ Chr, that is possible
only if w0
h = minfqh;whg, where h is an arbitrarily chosen hospital such that
w0
h    qh = i(w0). Now it should be the case that w00
h = minfqh;whg as well,
because otherwise w00 = 2 argmaxrfxjx  wg.40 Thus w0
h = w00
h. Now consider the
modied vectors of both w0 and w00 that delete the entries corresponding to h. All
the properties described above hold for these new vectors. Proceeding inductively,
we obtain w0
h = w00
h for all h, that is, w0 = w00. This is a contradiction to the
assumption that w0 = 2 argmaxrfxjx  wg and w00 2 argmaxrfxjx  wg.
The above cases complete the proof. 
Theorem 4 and Propositions 5 and 6 imply Theorem 2 in the main text.
Appendix C. Proof of Theorem 3
Proof. Part (1) First note that the description of the deferred aceptance algorithm in the
main text can be modied so that at each step t, each hospital regards all applications
made to it so far as the set of applications it considers. We consider this (equivalent)
version of the deferred acceptance algorithm in this proof.
Let  and 0 be the matchings produced by the deferred acceptance mechanism and by
the exible deferred acceptance mechanism, respectively. Let CD(t) be the set of applica-
tions (pairs of a doctor and a hospital) that have been made up to and including step t
of the deferred acceptance algorithm, and CF(t) be the corresponding set for the exible
deferred acceptance algorithm. Let TD and TF be the termination steps for the deferred
acceptance algorithm and for the exible deferred acceptance algorithm, respectively.
40The proof that w00 = 2 argmaxrfxjx  wg if w00
h < minfqh;whg is as follows. Suppose that w00
h <




h0 1 for some h0 such that w00
h0  qh0 = i(w00),
and w000
h00 = w00
h00 for all h00 2 Hr n fh;h0g. Then we have w000
h    qh = w00
h    qh + 1  w0
h    qh < w00
h0    qh0 =
w000
h00    qh0, where the weak inequality follows because w00
h < minfqh;whg = w0
h. Thus w000
h    qh  w000
h0    qh0,
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We rst show that CD(TD)  CF(TF). To see this, suppose the contrary, i.e., that
CD(TD) 6 CF(TF). Then there exists step t0 such that CD(t)  CF(TF) for all t < t0 and
CD(t0) 6 CF(TF) holds. That is, t0 is the rst step such that an application not made in
the exible deferred acceptance algorithm is made in the deferred acceptance algorithm.
Let h be the hospital that d applies to in this step. Notice that h d d and 0
d d h,
hence it must be the case that 0
d d d. This implies that 0
d 6= ; and that d is rejected
by 0
d in some steps of the deferred acceptance algorithm. Let the rst of such steps be
t00. Since in the deferred acceptance algorithm doctors apply to hospitals in order of their
preferences, 0
d d d implies that t00 < t0, which in turn implies CD(t00)  CF(TF) by the
denition of t0.
Now, we argue that the set of doctors accepted by 0
d at step t00 of the deferred accep-
tance algorithm is a superset of the set of doctors accepted by 0
d from the applicantion
pool CD(t00) (which is a subset of CF(TF)) at step TF of the exible deferred acceptance
algorithm. To see this, note that if the same set of application pool CF(TF) is given,
the set of doctors accepted by 0
d in the deferred acceptance algorithm is weakly larger
than that of the exible deferred acceptance algorithm, by the construction of these algo-
rithms. Since in the deferred acceptance algorithm 0
d accepts applications in order of its
preferences, subtracting applications in CF(TF)nCD(t00) does not shrink the set of doctors
accepted by 0
d within CD(t00) at step t00 of the deferred acceptance, which establishes our
claim.
However, this contradicts our earlier conclusion that d is rejected by 0
d at step t00 of
the deferred acceptance algorithm while she is matched with 0
d in the exible deferred
acceptance algorithm. Hence we conclude that CD(TD)  CF(TF).
Now, since in the deferred acceptance algorithm each doctor d applies to hospitals in
order of her preferences, d is being unmatched or the worst hospital for d in the set
of hospitals associated with d in CD(TD). Similarly, for each doctor d, 0
d is the worst
hospital for d in the set of hospitals associated with d in CF(TF). If d 6= ;, this and
CD(TD)  CF(TF) implies that d d 0
d. If d = ;, d has applied to all acceptable
hospitals in the deferred acceptance algorithm. Thus CD(TD)  CF(TF) impies that she
has applied to all acceptable hospitals in the exible deferred acceptance algorithm, too.
Let h0 be the worst acceptable hospital for d. Again, CD(TD)  CF(TF) implies that all
applications associated with h0 in CD(TD) is in CF(TF). In particular, d's application to
h0 is in CF(TF). Since in the deferred acceptance algorithm h0 accepts applications in
order of its preferences, subtracting applications in CF(TF)nCD(TD) does not shrink the
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being accepted by h0 from CD(TD) at step TD of the deferred acceptance algorithm implies
that she is not accepted by h0 from CF(TF) in step TF of the exible deferred acceptance
algorithm either. But since we have shown that d's application to h0 is in CF(TF), this
implies that in the exible deferred acceptance algorithm d is rejected by h0. Because
h0 is the worst acceptable hospital for d and d's applications are made in order of her
preferences, we conclude that 0
d = ;, thus in particular d d 0
d.
This shows that each doctor d 2 D weakly prefers a matching produced by the deferred
acceptance mechanism to the one produced by the exible deferred acceptance mechanism.
Our claim on the comparison between the exible deferred acceptance mechanism and
the JRMP mechanism can be proven in an analogous manner.
Part (2) The second part of the theorem's statement is an immediate corollary of the
rst. 
Appendix D. Semi-strong stability
In the main text, we pointed out that a strongly stable matching may not exist. Then
we weakened the requirement and introduced the stability concept. A natural question is
whether a concept stronger than stability can be imposed. To investigate this issue, we
dene the following notion.
Denition 8. A matching  is semi-strongly stable if it is feasible, individually ratio-
nal, and if (d;h) is a blocking pair then (i) jr(h)j = qr(h), (ii) d0 h d for all d0 2 h, and
(iii") either d = 2 Hr(h) or jhj    qh  0  jdj    qd.
The second part of condition (iii") says that a blocking pair (d;h) is not deemed as a
legitimate deviation if doctor d is currently assigned in the region r(h), the number of
doctors matched with hospital d is no more than its target, and that of hospital h is
no less than its target. That is, a blocking pair that moves the distribution of doctors
unambiguously away from the target capacity is not deemed to be a valid deviation.
Note that some blocking pairs that are regarded as illegitimate deviations are considered
legitimate under this concept. For example, if hospital h1 has a target 1 and jh1j = 10,
hospital h2 has a target 5 and jh2j = 7, and these two hospitals are in the same region,
then a movement of a doctor from h2 to a vacant position of h1 is considered a valid
deviation in semi-strong stability but not in stability.
Although semi-strong stability may seem to be an appropriate weakening of strong
stability, unfortunately it has the same de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stable matching does not necessary exist, and there exists no mechanism that selects a
semi-strongly stable matching whenever there exists one.
The following example shows that a semi-strongly stable matching may not exist.
Example 13 (Semi-strongly stable matching may not exist). There is one region r with
regional cap qr = 1, in which three hospitals, h1, h2 and h3, reside. Each hospital h has a
capacity of qh = 1. Suppose that there are two doctors, d1 and d2. Targets for hospitals
are ( qh1;  qh2;  qh3) = (0;0;1). We assume the following preference:
h1: d1;d2; h2: d2;d1; h3: arbitrary;
d1: h2;h1; d2: h1;h2:
Matching  such that h1 = fd1g and h2 = h3 = ; is stable. Similarly 0 such that
0
h1 = h3 = ; and 0
h2 = fd2g is also stable. It is easy to see that these are the only stable
matchings. However, neither  nor 0 is semi-strongly stable. To see that  is not semi-
strongly stable, note that a pair (d1;h2) constitutes a blocking pair and d1 = h1 2 Hr(h2),
and jh1j >  qh1. Similarly 0 is not semi-strongly stable. Therefore, a semi-strongly stable
matching does not exist in this market.
Note that Example 13 is similar to Example 4. In an analogous manner, we can
easily modify Example 5 to construct an example in which there is no mechanism that
is strategy-proof for doctors and nds a semi-strongly stable matching whenever there
exists one.